Arguments against the validity of the inference to the best viable explanation from an eco-cognitive perspective of abduction

Abstract

In the following text I defend the falsity of IB(A)E / abductive reasoning equivalence theory. I do it through 3 points. First, I offer a theoretical explanation about the first and second abductive reasoning research generation, in which I characterize and remark its most important topics, as it is known, fill-up problem and cutdown-problem. At the second point, I present the classic debate in which, supposedly, there is the relation between IB(A)E and abduction. My intention is to show that the real topic in this debate is not about abduction’s topics, but induction ones. In the third point, I present and analyze the solution of «availability» concept, offered to refute logic and epistemological critics about «best» concept. Here, I present two arguments, which show the difficult increases of their validity because, in the end, from a cognitive point of view, IB(A)E is a pipedream.

Keywords: abductive reasoning, inference to the best explanation, inference to the best available explanation.