Method and Cogito in Descartes and Husserl

Abstract

The methodical doubt is one of the most important elements in René Descartes’ metaphysical project. As a result of the method, the cogito acquires a special status and a central role in the foundation of the sciences. In line with the conception of philosophy as first philosophy, Edmund Husserl put forward, centuries later, the method of epoché, partly being heir of the Cartesian doubt. However, Husserl’s phenomenological approach led him to introduce variations in the method, as well as to draw different conclusions from it concerning the cogito. This paper summarizes the dialectics between these two authors about these issues, following Husserl’s criticisms to his predecessor. These criticisms accuse Descartes of not having been able to reach the field of phenomenology despite having been about to.

Key words: Method, doubt, epoché, cogito, Descartes, Husserl.