Premi Nobel d'Economia 2009, concedit a Elinor Ostrom i Oliver E. Williamson

Abstract

Prof. Oliver Williamson has argued that markets and hierarchical organizations, such as firms, represent alternative governance structures which differ in their approaches to resolving conflicts of interest. The drawback of markets is that they often entail haggling and disagreement. The drawback of firms is that authority, which mitigates contention, can be abused. Competitivemarkets work relatively well because buyers and sellers can turn to other trading partners in case of dissent. However, when market competition is limited, firms are better suited for conflict resolution than markets. A key prediction of Williamsons theory, which has also been supported empirically, is therefore that the propensity of economic agents to conduct their transactions inside the boundaries of a firm increases in direct proportion to the specificity of the assets involved in the relationship between the contractual parties. Prof. Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fishing grounds, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision- making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes.