Putin's strategy: stabilization through subordination to the US

Abstract

Russias position in the world is determined by its relations with the US. After its defeat in the ColdWar, both democrats and communists hoped for some form of parity but the US had not defeated Russia to concede parity. The US unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001, the START negotiations lost all meaning, NATO has steadily expanded despite Russias objections and Russia has accepted US bases in Central Asia. Russia can seek solace in the NMD not being technologically convincing, in NATO being too flabby for action (and Russia itself being a part of NATO), in the terrorist threat of the Taliban being eliminated, and in the absence of direct confrontation with the US. In order to ward off threats like the Chechen insurgency, Russia has turned its attention to reforming the army and to conventional capability. Today, Russias dealings with Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have more to do with commercial calculations than challenges to the US. Its special relationships with China and India that are genuinely independent of the US are likewise driven by commercial issues, such as large scale arms sales, rather than strategic considerations, although the latter are always kept in reserve should they be needed.