

#### 4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ANTONIUS ANDREAЕ'S *SCRIPTUM IN ARTEM VETEREM* AND *ABBREVIATIO OPERIS OXONIENSIS SCOTI*

*De tribus principiis naturae* and *Scriptum aureum in Metaphysicam* are two best-known works of Antonius Andreae. It does not mean, however, that none of the remaining ones was found worthy of interest and remembrance by his contemporaries and posterity. To the contrary: at least two other titles became associated with his name for good. They were the *Scriptum in Artem Veterem* and the *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti*. Admittedly, if their popularity were to be measured in the number of manuscript copies and printed editions, neither of them could compare with the *Metaphysics* questions or even with *De tribus principiis*. Still, with almost 10 manuscripts and several editions of each, they belong to the group of relatively well circulated works and by no means could be called obscure.

Both of the works share a common trait: unlike the two most popular ones they do not refer to philosophy in the strict sense but to related disciplines, if we can use this term for logic and theology. Both, too, profess their fidelity to the doctrine of Duns Scotus and have served as tools for its propagation. The third characteristic they have in common is that in neither of them Antonius Andreae is able to conceal his true interest, which is philosophy and, especially, philosophy of nature. The latter two qualities make them similar to the two works of Antonius already discussed here. For someone trying to classify the works of Antonius they could fall under the category of «apparently non philosophical but strongly philosophising, outright Scotist works».

The differences between the two seem to be at least equally numerous. First of all, they belong to different disciplines, which results in obvious differences in the subjects discussed in them; secondly, they have different form, which makes the author present his opinions in a way appropriate for the literary genre, finally, despite the fact that they were both relatively well-known as pieces of writing, our knowledge about them is not equally deep or, to tell the truth, not equally scant.

It is almost certain that *Scriptum in Artem Veterem* is the earlier one of the two. Thanks to the research of Vázquez Janeiro we can assume that at least part of it was ready by 1312, some five years after his return from Paris<sup>1</sup> (unless the remark he has discovered in a manuscript in Pamplona refers to Antonius' *Quaestiones ordinariae in logica*, i.e. *De modis distinctionum*, which would put off the date of its composition a little). Anyway, it was the last part of a chain of works he composed in a relatively short ti-

1. Cf. I. Vázquez Janeiro, *Rutas e hitos del escotismo primitivo en Espana*, in: *Homo et mundus. Acta quinti Congressus Scotistici Internationalis*, Roma 1984, p. 432-436.

me, when teaching philosophy of nature and logic at the Franciscan convent in Monzón. It seems his duties obliged him to devote similar amount of time to philosophy and logic, for the works he had written there are almost symmetrically divided; to each of the subjects he devotes one set of *quaestiones ordinariae*: *De tribus principiis naturae* and *De modis distinctionum*, respectively, and one commentary: *Scriptum aureum in Metaphysicam* and *Scriptum in Artem Veterem*. One can note certain asymmetry of size, in favour of the philosophical works, but if Antonius had completed the commentary on the remaining parts of the *Organum* as he had planned, both disciplines would have been in perfect balance in his works. It is not difficult to see that the choice of the texts for commentary does not depend solely on the subject to be discussed, otherwise he would have rather chosen *Physics* as more suitable for a course in natural philosophy; what seems another important factor is presence of a related work by Duns Scotus, which could serve as a model or at least a source of inspiration for Antonius - in the case of the *Metaphysics* commentary it was Scotus' *Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam*, for the commentary on the «Old Logic» such a source is to be found in Scotus' questions on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Hermeneutics* and Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Antonius' approach to Scotus' questions in *Scriptum in Artem Veterem* largely reflects that seen in his *Metaphysics* commentary, for he applies the same three techniques: he either paraphrases, reworks and develops some of them, or addresses the same problem in partly or entirely different way, or - finally - substitutes Scotus questions with his own ones. Needless to say, the first technique is applied more often, the second and third - less.

As it was the case with the *Scriptum aureum in Metaphysicam* Scotus' parallel work provided the core for Antonius' commentary, but the form was modelled on the commentaries by Thomas Aquinas. Unlike the *Metaphysics* commentary, *Scriptum in Artem Veterem* managed to preserve its original form of literal commentary with embedded questions explaining certain problems. When it was divided, it was divided into its constitutive parts, i.e. commentaries to: *Isagoge*, *Categories*, *Hermeneutics*, *Liber divisionum* by Boethius and *Liber sex principiorum* ascribed to Gilbert de la Porrée. Not incidentally, those parts which have counterparts in Scotus' are preserved in more manuscripts. It is clear, however, that the work was meant to constitute a unity - like the *Metaphysics* commentary it possesses a common prologue, starting with the same passage from the Scripture, and an introductory question on the subject-matter of logic, preceding the first commentary.<sup>2</sup>

The philosophical issues are not central in the *Scriptum in Artem Veterem*, still they occupy some space there, especially - and expectedly - in the commentary on the *Categories* and, to a lesser degree on the *Isagoge*. They are mostly concentrated on two problems: one refers to categories as real genera of being, the other - to the ontological status of the universals, particularly their relation to individuals. Let me offer a few words of comment on each.

2. Cf. M. Gensler, *Catalogue of works by or ascribed to Antonius Andreae*, «Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum XXXI (1992)», p. 147-149.

Already in the beginning of the *Categories* commentary, Antonius Andreae shows that the concept of category is not merely a logical term for him. He claims that categories can be approached by a philosopher from two points of view: as beings (*entia*) and classes of properties analysed by the intellect. The former approach is characteristic for a metaphysician, as the first subject of the categories there is being; the latter approach is more appropriate for a logician, since it considers the inherent, most general properties of being. Antonius then proceeds to ask about the subject of categories understood in the logical way. He refuses to accept the extreme nominalist solution trying to see that subject in words only and replies that the first subject of categories is an incomplex being belonging to a genus and predicated of by all the categories univocally. By virtue of univocal predication all categories can be reduced to it and, accordingly, it can be treated as the first of them in predication, causation and existence. This very subject is the category of substance.<sup>3</sup>

Thus substance becomes the principal object of interest for Antonius Andreae, who, in a familiar manner, begins the analysis of the concept with a presentation of several distinctions of it. First of all, when talking about substance, he refers to the concept in its general sense or distinguishes between primary and secondary substance. Substance in the general sense, or substance as such, is described by Antonius in accordance with the Aristotelian «definition» of it: as the first category, which refers to being of itself and which can only be a subject of predication but never predicating of anything itself. Such a description includes the characteristics of both primary and secondary substance: taken as the highest category, it is the supreme genus, with all other genera and species of creatures falling under it; at the same time, it also stands for what exists of itself, i.e. concrete individuals. Antonius accepts Aristotle's opinion that primary substances are substances in the strictest sense, since secondary substances can, after all, be predicated of individuals, though in a different way from the accidents, since they share the same essence with individuals. That means that secondary substances are in a way dependent on individuals as their subjects; for that reason he frequently uses the term «substance» with reference to primary substances only.<sup>4</sup>

Another distinction pertains to the so-called «intention», a Boethian concept which was well developed by Scotus and which was later adapted by Ockham in his doctrine of supposition. Antonius Andreae distinguishes two intentions in subjects (and accidents as well). Something treated as a real object is in the first intention, something treated as a concept only is in the second intention. The division into intentions can be superimposed on the one into primary and secondary substances and thus Antonius arrives at four different meanings a noun standing for a substance can have: individual object or species, its concept, a genus to which they belong and the concept of it. The «moral» which he draws from the division is that whatever is in the second intention belongs to the realm of logic, what is in the first intention is interesting also for a metaphysician.<sup>5</sup>

3. Cf. *Antonii Andreae scriptum super totam Artem veterem*, Venetiis 1480, f. 1rb-2ra.

4. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 21vb-23rb.

5. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 3ra-b.

Despite the distinctions, Antonius keeps on stressing the metaphysical unity of substance, which stems from the unity of essence. Although distinction between the primary and secondary substances is not merely logical distinction of terms, for, as we have seen, one refers to nature contracted by individual difference and the other - to nature accepted universally, he reiterates that they both refer to one and the same nature, which of itself is indifferent to either individuality or universality. The «secondariness» of the secondary substance is derived from the fact that it predicates about the primary one just like accidents, though not in the same way. The difference lies in the type of predication, for universals are predicated *of* things, i.e. they refer to the same essence, while accidents are predicated *in* them, i.e. their essence is different from the essence of their subjects.<sup>6</sup>

Predication is a vast subject Antonius Andreae devotes much attention to, especially in the commentary to the *Isagoge*. In discussing its types, he distinguishes between predication *in quid*, i.e. essential, and *in quale*, i.e. denominative. The former says *what* something is and can refer to the essence of something either as a whole and then it is the predication of the species, e.g. «Socrates is a man» or partially, when it is the predication of the genus, e.g. «A man is an animal», for there is the whole essence of man both in Socrates and man, whereas animal refers only to a part of human essence. The latter type of predication says what something is *like* and is also further subdivided. The first subtype refers to the essence of a subject - this is the type of predication characteristic for specific differences, e.g. «Man is rational»; because the specific difference does not predicate something which is outside the essence of the subject, Antonius calls this subtype of predication *in quale quid*. The other subtype is accidental predication, which does not refer to the essence of the subject but to something external to it, namely a quality, quantity or any other dependent category, e.g. «Socrates is white». Antonius notes that the two subtypes are different due to different mode of existence (*modus essendi*).<sup>7</sup>

Beside systematising the concepts and explaining the terminology Antonius Andreae analyses problems, which are presented in the form of questions. His discussions concerning the double divisions of substance into primary and secondary on one hand and first and second intention on the other are illustrated with a question devoted to the problem of a «certain man». Antonius notes that «certain man» appears to belong to a category, which falls in between those of determinate substances, like Socrates, and indeterminate substances, like man. It seems to refer to a particular individual, yet to an unspecified one. In one word, it is determinate in an indeterminate way (*determinatus indeterminatus*). The solution Antonius proposes here is that «certain man» is an instance of accidental being. «Certain» gives it a determination similar to that given by «white»; however, unlike «white» it is not a quality which would have, like all accidents, its own essence outside the essence of the subject, and therefore it is not essentially different from its subject. «Certain man» is, therefore, a composite of something in first and second intention: it is predicated of like a singular object, yet it is understood in an universal way.<sup>8</sup>

6. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 2vb.

7. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 15rb-16va.

8. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 2va.

Another important issue raised in the questions is close to the problems analysed before in *De tribus principiis naturae* and *Scriptum aureum in Metaphysicam*. Antonius discusses whether or not parts of substance belong to the same category as well. He analyses several types of division of substance. As a subject of logical analysis, when it is treated as something that is predicated about and defined, it is composed of genus and specific difference. In metaphysical consideration, its constitutive parts are matter and form; he does not include, however the physical, or «quantitative» division into organic parts, since they are not «essential parts» of substance, i.e. they are not contained in the essence of a substance. The conclusion Antonius draws states that all essential parts of substance also belong to the category, although none of them is a substance in the strictest sense (*primo modo*), i.e. essentially and *per se*, because they do not possess their own quiddities, nor exist of themselves. They are, however, substances *secundo modo*, i.e. they exist with respect to the composite of which they are parts.<sup>9</sup>

What throws interesting light on the logical views of Antonius Andreae is a recent discovery of d'Ors, who has shown that Antonius departs from the teaching of Duns Scotus on the nature of concepts and while using the text of Scotus as a model for his own question, he defends a doctrine different from that of his master and anticipating that of William of Ockham. D'Ors argues that in a question to Aristotle's *Hermeneutics* where Antonius discusses whether a name signifies a thing or a passion in the soul, he takes a different stand from that of Scotus in the parallel question, namely, while conceding that a name signifies a thing, he describes that thing as indifferent to actual existence and external attributes. With such a description a thing can naturally refer both to external things, i.e. individuals and to passions of the soul, i.e. concepts but more likely to the latter, since the former is usually understood *with* actual existence and attributes. D'Ors mollifies the impression of Antonius' shift from Scotus by showing that Duns Scotus' own position on the issue developed too: in *Lectura in I librum Sententiarum* he presented the opinion that the two modes of signification by a name are not irreconcilable and in *Reportata Parisiensis* he said that something is signified by a name and by the concept but the latter signifies it more immediately, thus allowing an interpretation that the concept or passion in the soul is signified by a name too.<sup>10</sup>

It has been said in the beginning of this lecture that it is difficult for Antonius to conceal his real interest - the philosophy of nature - even in a logical work like the commentary on the *Ars Vetustis* and the digressions into the realm of physics sometimes take the form of whole questions. A good example of that attitude is the discussion of one of his favourite problems, addressed also in *De tribus principiis naturae* and the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, namely the grades of substantial form. The inclusion of it in a logical work is thinly veiled with its reference to the question whether substance includes contrariedades. Having discussed the logical

9. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 22va-b.

10. A. d'Ors, *Utrum nomen significet rem vel passionem in anima*. Antonio Andrés y Juan Duns Escoto, «Archives d' Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge», LXII (1995), p. 17-27.

aspect of the problem, concerning the character of opposition between the differences dividing the genus into species he passes to the analysis of the opposition he finds particularly attractive, i.e. the opposition between «more» and «less». His fascination with the problem can be measured by the sheer volume of the question devoted to it; in spite of the fact that it is devoted to a marginal issue it is one of the longest questions in the whole commentary.

Antonius remains committed to the solution he gave to the question earlier but does not limit himself to repetition of previously presented theses. In the very beginning he presents an interesting distinction concerning the terms applied in discussing change: *motus*, *mutatio* and *transmutatio*. There he develops the characteristics of the concepts he started in the *Metaphysics* commentary. The explanations he gives to the meanings of each of the three concepts bear witness to the lack of consistency which can be seen in names given to physical processes by medieval natural philosophers. Antonius notes that change is a concept which can be understood in a double way, as it really applies to two types of processes: either it refers to internal or to local change of an object. The former process is further divided into substantial and accidental change. Substantial change, which includes the processes of generation and corruption, is characterised by having one positive and one negative end in the process (from non-something into something or the other way round). According to Antonius, this type of change cannot be called *motus*, since that name is reserved for change both ends of which are something positive. Therefore, it can be concluded that *mutatio* can be used as the general term for change, comprising *motus* as the term for local change and *transmutatio* for internal change, either only substantial (in the strict sense) or also accidental (in the broader sense).

The thesis Antonius presents after the distinctions is interesting too; in what seems to be a partial retreat from the earlier full commitment to the doctrine of remission and intension of substantial forms, he states that at least some substantial forms accept grades. The arguments and examples which follow concern solely the remission and intension in elementary forms. He argues that elements can contain opposite forms, e.g. calidity and frigidity, one of the pair being *in esse intenso*, the other - *in esse remisso*. The form the intension of which is greater is dominant and determines what the substance is like, i.e. whether it is water or fire, etc. Thus, in a process of transmutation of elements, one can observe successive remission of one attribute with simultaneous intension of its opposite. The moment the two attributes are equally intensive is the moment of substantial change.<sup>11</sup>

The presented above selection of philosophical problems analysed in *Scriptum in Artem Veterem*, which I have tried to make representative of the whole, seems to be sufficient to offer a few words of general comment. We can see there, as we have seen in some other cases before, that remaining generally faithful to the teaching of his master Antonius treats the legacy of Scotus' works in a pretty liberal and individual way, sometimes

11. Antonius Andreae, *op. cit.*, p. 24ra-25ra.

preferring some solutions to some other ones. Not incidentally, in cases of doubts and discrepancies between them, he opts for solutions found in Scotus' later works, which - we can guess - reflect the opinions he heard from Scotus himself. He develops those opinions by polishing them up, providing them with additional examples and arguments and, most important of all, locating all the concepts with a neat framework of distinctions. Some of Antonius' interpretations of the Subtle Doctor do, indeed, seem to be at the point of drifting away from his point of view, yet it must be honestly admitted that it happens only in the cases where Scotus' own teaching is not particularly clear, either because he changed his mind in different works, or because he presented his opinion in a way obscure enough to allow a double reading.

*Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti*, this title alone is showing manifestly that the work it serves does not have much pretence of originality. Of all the writings of Antonius Andreae it is the least individual; so much that his authorship was frequently overlooked and ignored. Only one out of nine manuscripts of it identify the author as Antonius Andreae, six call him *Scotulus* or *Scotellus*, the nickname he shared with Peter of Aquila, the remaining three giving false attribution or no name at all.<sup>12</sup> One could doubt whether a summary can have an author other than that of the whole work. After all, Antonius only abbreviates *Opus oxoniense*, preserving its structure and spirit almost entirely. In the questions of *Abbreviatio* he seldom transforms or substitutes the titles of the original, giving it an appearance of an almost mechanically shortened copy.

Still, there are certain traits, which allow to treat it differently. Even though Antonius never explicitly refers to his own writings it is possible to see some individual features of the *Abbreviatio*. One, which has already been mentioned, is the «uneven» treatment of Scotus' text; for most part Antonius abbreviates the text of Scotus and yet there are questions which are longer in abbreviation! Naturally, it happens usually in the places where Antonius inserts additional comments *pro maiori dilucidatione circa verba Doctoris* [for the better explanation of the words of the Doctor]. Those comments are typical of Antonius: distinctions concerning terms and concepts, clear conclusions flowing from consistently arranged arguments, etc. What is worth noting is that such «elongations» refer to questions concerning philosophical, if not strictly physical, problems like individuation through matter or plurality of substantial forms. Another individual trait is the repeated arguments with Peter Auriol, Antonius' favourite polemicist, whose name appears even more often than in other works. Accordingly, in my presentation of the philosophical problems from *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis* I shall focus on a few examples of issues, wherein Antonius demonstrates that he is not only the abbreviator but also the author.

In the questions concerning the problem of individuation Antonius seems to supplement the text of *Opus oxoniense* with the material which can be found in *Reportata parisiensis* but which can also be Antonius' own notes or recollections of Scotus' lectures he heard in Paris. Symptomati-

12. Cf. M. Gensler, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

cally, he applies the term *haecceitas* absent in *Ordinatio* but appearing in the Parisian version of Scotus' *Sentences* commentary. In a similar mode, Antonius abstains from calling the individual property an individual «form», even though Scotus used this term in *Ordinatio*, instead he prefers to speak of «ultimate reality», which is different from either form, or matter, or the composite but is an ultimate act of the quiddity.<sup>13</sup>

A number of interesting comments can be found in the discussions concerning form. The concept of form itself receives some attention too. Antonius tries to describe the role and function of form and notes that in creatures it is characterised by three features: it is a part of the whole, it is the principle which gives something its shape or form, and is that which makes things «such», e.g. by animating them. He observes that the first two features denote certain imperfection, namely suggest some partiality on its part; the third, however, denotes a perfection and it is in that very sense that the concept of form can refer to God.<sup>14</sup> The characteristics of form applies to all types of it, although principally it refers to substantial form, which is ontologically first. The other two types of form distinguished by Antonius are elementary and accidental forms. It is interesting that he calls elementary form intermediate between the remaining two and explains that by the fact that it shares some qualities of both, e.g. like substantial form it constitutes «something», i.e. the given element, with primary matter, at the same time sharing a property characteristic for accidental forms, namely the ability to receive the grade of more or less. We can see here the final position of Antonius on the problem of remission and intension of substantial forms. He seems to have come back one more step to the point of view presented by Scotus. Contrary to what he said before, Antonius denies remission and intension in substantial forms; he concedes it in elementary forms but finds them to be another type of forms altogether.<sup>15</sup>

Arguments for discriminating elementary form as another type can be found when analysing the problem of plurality of substantial forms. According to Antonius, if elementary forms were «ordinary» substantial forms, they would be present in the individual informed by them alongside other substantial forms. However, unlike substantial forms many of which can coexist in one individual, the elementary ones cannot. Antonius explains that the substantial forms can coexist because they form a hierarchy, with the ultimate form being *in actu* and the subordinate ones *in potentia*. In the process of corruption, for instance, when the ultimate form, say the soul, is removed, what is left of the individual, i.e. the corpse, is informed by the second highest form: bodiness, which becomes actualised; the process goes so on until all forms are separated from matter. Forms of elements, however, are not subordinate to one another and are mutually opposite. Because of this, they cannot coexist, for water compri-

13. Cf. S.D. Dumont, *The Question on Individuation in Scotus' «Quaestiones super Metaphysicam»*, in: *Via Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale*, Roma 1995, p. 195-225 and M. Gensler, *The Concept of the Individual in the Sentences Commentary of Antonius Andreae*, «Miscellanea Mediaevalia» 24 (1996), p. 311-312.

14. Cf. Antonius Andreae, *In quattuor libros Sententiarum opus*, Venetiis 1578, p. 31ra.

15. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 69vb.



sed in one body would corrupt its fire, the earth would corrupt the air, and the other way round. Therefore, the form of a body (*forma mixtionis*) dissolves the forms of elements, so that they do not remain in it lest they destroyed the body.<sup>16</sup>

An interesting example, showing that Antonius Andreae read Peter Auriol not only to criticise him, can be found in the question devoted to the problem of accidental form in transubstantiation. Discussing whether accidents possess an ability to exist without a subject, Antonius cites the opinion of Peter, who says that the subject is not an intrinsic cause for its accidents, much like matter is not an intrinsic cause for its form, even though they constitute a composite together. He accepts it with some reservations claiming, namely, that though the accidents are not the intrinsically caused by the subject, they are, nevertheless, dependent on it as they are contained in it. Antonius notes that in analysing the dependence of accidents on the subject one can distinguish between two types of continence: actual and aptitudinal. The former is not included in the essence of an accident and, therefore, it can be comprehended and defined abstracting from it and in this sense accident can be said to be independent of its subject. The latter is included in the essence of an accident, as it is by its very nature apt to be included in a subject and thus is dependent on it; Antonius concedes, however, that the subject does not necessarily have to be a substance and so accidents can exist without substance.<sup>17</sup>

Granting accidents relative independence of the substance Antonius is quick to restrict that freedom. He maintains that although accidents separated from substance can act in the same way as accidents in a substance, they cannot affect substance, i.e. cause its generation or corruption. He illustrates the claim with a vivid example taken from Scotus and saying that all heat of fire, if separated from it, could not destroy a single drop of water; it could, however, destroy coldness separated from water. In this way he confirms the primacy of substance.<sup>18</sup>

A close search through the *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti* would no doubt yield more passages showing Antonius Andreae's originality in the approach to the work of his master. Still, I hope that the ones presented above are representative enough to offer a few words of general comment. First and foremost, the work contains material which allows to treat as a work of Antonius Andreae: we can see many traces of his individual interests and views both in his attitude to the legacy of the teaching of the Subtle Doctor: preference of some solutions to others, and in the insertion of discussions of problems interesting to himself: polemics and references to Peter Auriol and physical issues in general. Secondly, the *Abbreviatio* documents the development of Antonius' own views, too; this could be seen on the example of the problem of remission and intention of elementary and substantial forms. Thirdly, it is yet another piece in which Antonius shows his mastery in clearing up the obscurity of Scotus - this time in the most immediate way: rewriting his text anew, so that everyone could understand it.

16. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 69vb-71vb.

17. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 139rb-140rb.

18. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 141ra.

*Scriptum in Artem Veterem* and *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti* close the group of the main works of Antonius Andreae, the presentation of which was meant to give you an insight into the views of our philosopher. That being done, the time has come to offer a few words of final conclusions. In the 15th century Antonius was frequently addressed by his nicknames: *Scotellus* and *Doctor dulcifluus*. They conveyed the attitude of the contemporary students of his works to the person of the Spanish pupil of Duns Scotus. It is clear that he was seen first of all as a spitting image of his master, differing only with the clarity of his style. Fidelity and clarity - these two qualities taken together gave Antonius enormous popularity growing alongside the growth of the Scotist school and bringing him a dubious splendour of becoming best Scotist textbook writer. Once fixed, the label stuck to Antonius and remained on him over the centuries until our times. The aim of the four lectures, you were kind to listen to, was to check in how much the medieval readers of Antonius were right in their assessments.

*Scotellus*. Yes, indeed, Antonius Andreae's dependence on Scotus is evident. As we have seen, even the most original of his works, *De tribus principiis naturae*, discusses many of the same questions Scotus had addressed before, commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and *Ars Vetus* make explicit use of Scotus' works on the same subject, while *Abbreviatio Operis Oxoniensis Scoti* reworks the text of the Subtle Doctor. Yet, we have also seen that Antonius was by no means copying slavishly what Scotus had written. Having been the pupil of Scotus he knew very well the doctrine of his master and thanks to that knowledge he could see, like no one else, the issues where Scotus' thought had evolved, the problems he had not solved or his solutions were so obscure that could hardly be understood. In such instances, Antonius showed a surprising degree of originality. His was the vision of Scotism as a complete system and to that end he worked. In his interpretation of Scotus varying opinions he consistently stuck to one solution only, usually that which he may have heard from Scotus himself, i.e. the later one, as it was the case with the problem of individuation. On the other hand, where he found Scotus' solutions insufficient or unsatisfactory, he tried to provide his own answer which would nevertheless remain in agreement with the bulk of Scotist doctrine. In some cases, as in the problem of the subject-matter of physics, he was satisfied with his first solution; in some other ones, as in the case of remission and intension of substantial forms, he would return to the problem again and again, as if feeling that it was still not quite that what he wanted or, possibly, what Scotus would have wanted.

*Doctor dulcifluus*. Here it is really difficult not to agree with the medieval readers of Antonius, who honoured him with the title. Of course, it is easy to be praised for a clear style when you are compared with notoriously obscure Scotus but Antonius works are striking with their transparency and consistency even in comparison with other thinkers of his times, e.g. his polemicist Peter Auriol. And this is small wonder for Antonius, faithful to Scotus in the doctrinal matters as he might be, took the lessons of style at the works of one of Scotus' main opponents: the Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas. As we have seen, already *De tribus principiis naturae* betrays certain interest in the writing of Aquinas; in the

Aristotle commentaries Antonius' imitation of the style of the Angelic Doctor is evident. This stylistic inspiration comes only for the better: it is thanks to Thomas Aquinas that Antonius acquires classical erudition, which misled Carreras y Artau to see his *Metaphysics* commentary as an early humanist work.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the systematic approach, which completed all the syllogisms and gave iron structure to all questions, with all important concepts being explained, all opinions discussed and all conclusions neatly enumerated, made the doctrine of Scotus, presented thus, accessible to all. Hence the enormous popularity.

All in all, while agreeing in general with the opinion expressed by those titles, we can now see Antonius Andreae - I hope - not as a mere shadow of Duns Scotus but as a philosophical personality of his own. His dedication to the doctrine of Scotus and his ability to propagate it make him an important figure not only for the history of Scotism, of which he was - to use the words of Bérubé - the second founder, but also in the history of later medieval philosophy in general. Granted, he was not a star but don't they give prizes to best supporting actors?

19. Cf. J. & T. Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la filosofía española*, II, Madrid 1943, p. 463-464.