Plaisir et amitié dans les Lettres à Lucilius Autors/ores Carlos Lévy Resum Pleasure is in Stoicism a negative passion, i.e. a disease of soul. At the contrary, joy is an eupatheia, a positive passion, that can be found only in the sage. As a concept, friendship is less present in this doctrine than in Epicureanism, but it can have a positive meaning, since true friendship is a feature of the sage. How does this two realities coexist in Senecas Letters? As a Stoic, but also as a Roman, both traditional and atypical, Seneca denies that pleasure, at least in its common meaning, could be an element of friendship and there is no trace in his Letters of what Greek philosophers called pedagogical erôs. From this point of view, he excludes uoluptas from amicitia. But, at the same time, he admits a kind of reflexive pleasure, that is to say the pleasure of having a soul free from common pleasures, and he uses uoluptas with the meaning of gaudium. This confusion establishes a kind of continuum, with a qualitative shift, in ethical life, from the errors of the stultus to the perfection of the sage. Descàrregues Text complet Publicat 2013-11-15 Número Núm. 28-29 (2012-2013) Secció Filosofia i literatura en època hel·lenística i romana Llicència Aquesta obra és subjecta —llevat que s'indiqui el contrari en el text, en les fotografies o en altres il·lustracions— a una llicència Reconeixement - No comercial - Sense obres derivades 3.0 Espanya de Creative Commons, el text complet de la qual es pot consultar a http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/deed.ca. Així, doncs, s'autoritza al públic en general a reproduir, distribuir i comunicar l'obra sempre que se'n reconegui l'autoria i l'entitat que la publica i no se'n faci un ús comercial ni cap obra derivada.