Catalonia in the process of constructing the modern Spanish state (16th-18th centuries): An interpretative approach

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Abstract

This article offers an interpretative overview of Catalonia’s difficult and ultimately forcible fit into the Spanish state that emerged in modern times. More specifically, it is concerned with the approximately 150-year period ranging from the mid-16th century to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in the early 18th century. This article’s interpretation of the Spanish state’s process of political union is an interpretative counterpoint to the deterministic vision that is so prevalent in Spanish nationalistic historiography.

Keywords: Catalonia, Spanish monarchy, state, nation, process of political union

Introduction

The process of construction of the modern Spanish state and the articulation of Catalonia’s historical formation have been and continue to be essential issues in the Catalan and Spanish historiographic debate.

In this article, we shall limit ourselves to summarily examining one phase in this long development, namely the period that signalled the transition from an aggregative, institutionally plural monarchy to another territorial form which, in the wake of the Bourbon victory in the War of the Spanish Succession, consolidated a central space – Spain – that was much more unified and characterised by absolutist and centralising forms of government with Castilian roots.1

It should immediately be noted that this kind of process of political “union” based on a “composite monarchy”, “segmented state” or “dyastic agglomeration” was not exclusive to Spain; rather it was fairly common in Europe in modern times.2 However, we should also add that these processes had quite different means and results in terms of both the constitutive model of state and its territorial organisation. These means were even more varied and nuanced if we bear in mind the evolution in such important social, cultural and identity features as religion, private law and language.3

With regard to the process of “union” in Spain in particular, it should be noted that a nationalistic geopolitical determinist historiographic discourse has prevailed for many years. According to this vision, the construction of a state entity linked to the Spanish “nation” was the only possible option for the trajectory of the different historical formations on Spain; this viewpoint also argues that the modernising pathway necessarily entailed the construction of a centralised, unified state. In the logic of this interpretation, the institutional pluralism of the Hapsburg monarchy would be a mediaevalising form of state, the reason behind the Spanish crisis in the 17th century during which Portugal was “lost”. This theoretical construct, which obviously has a strong political and ideological bias, was first elaborated by the intelligentsia of the Castilian court in the 16th and 17th centuries and more recently upheld by historians with a wide range of ideologies. Indeed, Falangists, monarchists, historians linked to a Marxist or Marxistising history, a good number of Basque and Catalan historians and some Hispanists have also partaken of this interpretation.4

Given that the unifying model of the Castilian court coexisted with the model of the Crown of Aragon in the early centuries of modernity, one of the fundamental purposes of this Spanish deterministic discourse was to discredit or distort the “confederal” and “constitutional” model of state of the Crown of Aragon and Catalonia, something which has been attempted from each of the territories linked to this model.

Specifically, the aims in the Spanish nationalist discourse to discredit Catalonia’s model stand upon three basic strands of argumentation. The first is the contrast between the modernising, rationalising qualities and economic efficacy of the unitarist, centralising route, compared to the delayed and “mediaevalising” constitutionalist and confederal model. The second is the criticism of this model for being a feudal, oligarchic and corrupt system. And finally, this Spanish nationalist historiographic discourse has striven to minimise or conceal the fact that

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it was forcibly imposed, along with the historical resist-
ances it has generated.

Many of the premises upon which this Spanish deter-
ministic discourse is based may simply be questioned
through a Europe-wide comparative historical exercise.
The cases of England, Sweden, Holland and the Helvet-
ic Union demonstrate that “old constitutionalism”, in
the famous expression coined by Charles H. Macllwain,1
evolved from forms based on shared sovereignty towards
republican models or models of parliamentary monarch-
cy, and finally to liberal democratic regimes through
longer or shorter transitional periods.6 In economics, for
example, as demonstrated by comparing the history of
France and England during the 18th century, by making
political contracts more reliable, the representative and
parliamentary systems paved the way for much more
modern economic relations and lower bank interest rates,
which offered better conditions for economic growth.7
European historiography in recent decades has also re-
vealed the political role of parliamentary assemblies in the
Middle Ages and modern centuries, stressing their values
of representativeness and defence of much more horizon-
tal interests than those held by monarchies with absolutist
leanings, which adopt much more pyramidal and oligar-
chic forms of government.8

What is more, the results of the Catalan historiographic
research which has examined this historical period in re-
cent years have directly and severely questioned the as-
sumptions of Spanish nationalist determinism. Thus, nu-
merous studies have revealed the evolutionary capacity of the
institutions in the Catalan pactist system in both theory
and political practice.9 The heavy aristocratisation of mu-
nicipal governments after the Nueva Planta Decree has ap-
parently been demonstrated, which in turn marginalised the
urban mesocracies that had traditionally been repre-
sented.10 In the realm of economic history, today we know
conclusively that the economic upswing of the late Modern
Age did not stem from the Bourbon administrative reforms
but from the specialisation and intensification of agricul-
ture and manufacturing, as well as from the ties that Cata-
lan trade had forged with the major circuits of world trade.
All of these processes had gotten underway before the ar-
ival of the Bourbons.11 Likewise, several studies have
shown the high degree of violence and repression used to
impose the Spanish unifying model manu militari.12 Most
of these studies have simply been ignored by Spanish na-
tionalist historiography, which is why we believe that the
interpretative synthesis offered in this article is not a stretch
in its attempt to analyse several key issues in the process of
constructing the modern Spanish state during this period.

**Two divergent models of state: Absolutism and constitutionalism**

Absolutism and constitutionalism have become two “strong” historiographic concepts in defining trends in
Western political thinking in the early Modern Age. However, we should bear in mind that these concepts are
neologisms coined in the 18th century and that they are far from being – in both theory and in the practice of gov-
ernment – contrasting or incompatible systems, as it might seem from the subsequent simplification and use of
them. Absolutism and constitutionalism were two branchings from the same trunk – the regimen of *res publica*
– which also had many other branches and intermediate “accents”.

Specifically, with regard to Spanish political thinking
during the reign of the Hapsburgs, the classic dichotomy
between Catalan-Aragonese constitutionalism and Cas-
tilian absolutism has been further nuanced and enriched.
Since the 1980s, a series of historians has noted the exist-
ence of a constitutionalist current linked to changes in the
tax system which were introduced in the Crown of Castile
late in the reign of Philip II; this Castilian constitutional-
ist thinking emerged among the urban oligarchies and
connected with the spirit of reform and regeneration in a
society and economy that had fallen into a grave crisis.13
However, this is not incompatible with the fact that
among the Castilian governing class linked to the central
administration of the monarchy – especially among the
intelligentsia at court – ideals with absolutist and uni-
formising tendencies took root that would dovetail with
the authoritarian principles of monarchic power already
developed in the Castile governed by the Trastamara dy-
nasty but that were now renewed and strengthened by the
modern influences of Machiavelli, Lips and especially Bod-
in.14

The thesis of sovereignty put forth by Jean Bodin and
other theoreticians of absolute monarchy only sparked
arguments to reinforce the legitimacy of a royal power
with absolutist tendencies which had a longstanding doc-
trinal tradition in Castile that can be dated back to the
reign of Alphonse X. After all, despite the existence of po-
itical and legal thinking that was critical – or relatively
critical – of the idea that the monarch was above positive
law and that he could therefore legislate and grant privi-
leges at will, the *comitis opinio* of the doctrine of Castil-
ian policy in the late Modern Age was that the sovereign
was only limited by divine law, natural law and the law of
nations.15

In short, in Castile, and more precisely in the monar-
chy’s spheres of central power, authoritarian and absolut-
ist trends would end up being imposed in both theory and
political practice. This would also have repercussions on
the monarchy as a whole, given that if institutional diver-
sity is viewed as a source of weakness, respect for the
forms of government local to each kingdom or province
would be questioned16 and attempts would be made to in-
troduce the political underpinnings of Castilian law
there.17

However, the interplay of balances and imbalances be-
tween king and kingdom would follow quite different
evolutions in modern times in the different kingdoms
and provinces that made up the composite monarchies. Thus, the political and ideological principles of Catalan-Aragonese pactism evolved in a direction completely different to the theorisations of the Castilian court. In Aragon and Catalonia, especially after the late decades of the 16th century, the legalist formulations of the legal consultants found new elements in the historic discourse to invigorate contractualist approaches. Specifically, the myth of the *furs* (codes of law) of Sobrarb and a new story on the Carolingian origins of Catalonia enabled them to build ideological and juridical elaborations that would provide arguments and political fuel to the movements of 1591 and 1640.18

In Catalonia, as is known, the thesis of corporate sovereignty had been assimilated back in the 13th century, and in the Late Middle Ages, jurists like Jaume Callís disseminated the idea of the *res publica* as a "mystical body" which placed the prince at the helm and his vassals as the members.19 This corporativist discourse, however, embodied a tension between the two poles of legitimacy (king and community), a tension that was reflected in the heated controversy over the conception and nature of the assembly representing the community, the Courts.

This pactist or contractualist conception of power, which can be summarised in the formula "king and parliament", gained an important theoretical alternative after the late 16th century. According to the increasingly clear perception of the strength of corporate assemblies and, in short, political communities in many parts of Europe, especially in England,20 in Catalonia a new conception of corporate sovereignty was also introduced which can be summarised in the formula "*rex in curiae*", which is equivalent to the English "*King in Parliament*". According to this theorisation, the king was encompassed by a body from which he could not be distinguished and in which his power was subsumed. This formula, which in turn allowed for a variety of interpretations (more or less restrictive with regard to royal power), can be noted in Catalonia in the works of Antoni Oliba, Andreu Bosc and especially Joan Pere Fontanella. The latter, drawing inspiration from the Aragonese jurist Pedro Luis Martínez, as well as from Francisco Suárez, stated that the supreme power did not fall in the king’s hands but in the king along with the branches or estates.21

However, on the threshold in the Revolution of 1640, the issue of the locus of sovereignty would develop an even more ground-breaking proposition: the thesis of original popular sovereignty, which would place the Catalan community, not the prince nor the community-prince binomial, at the legitimising core of sovereignty.

The populist theory of the source of the state’s power which had originally been formulated by authors like Francesc Eiximenis back in late mediaeval political thinking mainly reached Catalonia in the 17th century through the iusnaturalist populism from the 16th century Castilian scholasticists such as the Jesuit Francisco Suárez. They envisioned the state as a natural community that emerged from the social impetus of a collective that transferred power in order to fulfil its needs for defence and protection, while reserving freedom and sovereignty for itself.22

The principle that sovereignty naturally belonged to the community and that it could never abdicate this sovereignty was put forth by authors like Joan Pere Fontanella, Francesc Martí Viladamor and Acaci Ripoll in the legal-political treatises of the 1630s and 1640s. On the eve of 1640, the representative and parliamentary political principles (as well as the concept of popular sovereignty, the idea of an elective monarchy and the right of resistance) were rather deeply rooted in the Catalan body politic, and latent within them was the option of a parliamentary monarchy or even a fully republican option.23

In addition to the topic of the locus of sovereignty, the other key question in Catalan political thinking in the early Modern Age was the definition of the political community or the type of territorial state. However, we should recall that this topic was particularly complex given the "composite" or "segmented" nature of the majority of political formations in mediaeval and Renaissance Europe.

Generally speaking, the constitutionalist avenue of thought advocated a territorial model of state that recognised the institutional diversity of the historical formations that comprised it, while in the majority of cases the
absolutist and pro-uniformity tendencies were tamped down, since institutional diversity was interpreted as an obstacle to the strengthening of royal power.

It should be noted that there is no dearth of exceptions to this rule. Thus, a supporter of placing limits on monarchical power, Juan de Mariana, who even advocated tyrannicide, was, in contrast, a supporter of Spanish institutional unity. Likewise, we can find several theorists from the Crown of Aragon who upheld moderate regionalism (such as the Valencians Cristòfor Crespí de Vallcadaur and Llorenç Mateu i Sanz) while at the same time defending the local codes of law, privileges and institutions of each kingdom.

Early modern Catalan political thinking advocated, with only a handful of exceptions, even among the most royalist authors, an institutionally plural model of state. However, it should be noted that the mixture of the constitutional model of the exercise of power (which stipulated control of executive power according to representative assemblies) and the “confederal” model of the definition of state created ambiguities and problems that were not always thoroughly addressed or resolved in the constitutionalist theorisations.

There were essentially two problems: a) How to define – especially in view of international policy – an executive power shared by quasi-independent historical formations and at the same time by distinct geopolitical, economic and other interests, and b) how to adapt this model of state to growth through new territorial acquisitions from either marital ties or conquest. The case of the Spanish monarchy, which joined the Crowns of Aragon and Castile, the Portuguese empire and other territories, may be paradigmatic of this issue. The response to these questions in terms of political theory was the development of representative federal bodies (Courts of the monarchy and a kind of “council of councils”), which Diego Saavedra y Fajardo noted in the mid-17th century and which the Aragonese exiled Austriacist Juan Amor de Soria theorised more fully in the 18th century.

**Centre and periphery: The escalation of constitutional tensions**

The inclusion of the Catalan historical formation with mediaeval roots in a large “composite monarchy”, namely the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy, poses a historical dialectic between political “centre” and “periphery”, which, far from being particular or exceptional, was rather common in Europe during the early centuries of modernity.

It should first be noted that this relationship cannot only be conceived in terms of confrontation or political subordination, or simply based on the existence of a dichotomy between two compact poles of power: court and country. Yet nor should we forget the dynamic, not static, nature of the dialectic between the centre of the Spanish monarchy, the Castilian Court, and Catalonia, since this relationship went through a wide variety of circumstances in terms of the evolution in the human and material forces, the ideological elaborations, the social balances and imbalances and the international political contexts. Finally, we should also note that the political dialectic of the kingdoms and provinces on the periphery arose not only with the central government of the monarchy; rather especially in border provinces like Catalonia, there were also interrelations between them and neighbouring powers, France in this case.

However, these considerations do not belie the idea that there was almost permanent constitutional tension between centre and periphery given that their divergent conceptualisations on the model of state, as outlined above, would clash in political practice both when establishing the scope and limits of the jurisdiction of monarchical power and when defining and carrying out directives aimed at constructing a territorial state capable of being consolidated and conserved through the agitated, divided Europe of the early centuries of modernity.

The latest studies on the 16th century in Catalonia are making it increasingly clear that the political-constitutional edifice built since the late 15th-century reign of Ferdinand the Catholic soon revealed itself to be too fragile and precarious to ensure a correspondence or collaboration between the Catalans and the Crown. Back in the reign of Charles I and in the early years of Phillip II, the constitutional tensions blossomed in a variety of spheres. The institutional conflicts motivated by the royal officials’
violations of the constitution and the inoperativeness of the constitution of “Observança” approved in the Courts of Barcelona of 1480-1481 were coupled with jurisdictional clashes with the Tribunal of the Inquisition and the violence stemming from the presence of Spanish soldiers in the Principality. Likewise, since the 1420s, imperial policy in the Mediterranean had been seriously thwarting Catalan mercantile interests.29

This constitutional conflict would continue in the second half of the 16th century with two remarkable milestones: the confrontation between the Generalitat and the Crown in 1568-1569, which led to the imprisonment of deputies for having refused to contribute to paying the “excusat”,30 and especially the disturbances during the period 1587-1593. These latter events have been interpreted by the most recent Catalan historiography as a key juncture in the “political fracture” between Catalonia and the Hapsburg dynasty, which would place the relations between king and kingdom on the road towards the Revolution of 1640.31

The episodes of upheaval in 1587-1593 had major political and legal implications, since they entailed questioning the pre-eminence of royal jurisdiction in Catalonia and served as the catalyst for other constitutional disputes on the king’s potestas iuriscendi which would be put into place until the Revolution of 1640. Based on chapters 7 and 34 of the government’s new reform approved by the Courts of 1585, the interpretation was made that the divuitenes32 not only were charged with declaring violations of the constitutions but also had the authority to make legal annotations and issue the corresponding sanctions, bypassing the authority of the Audience (the highest court in Catalonia). To the Council of Aragon, the viceroy and the Audience, the proceedings regarding the violations of the constitutions undertaken by the divuitenes cast doubt on royal authority in the Principality and could even be considered a crime of lesé-majesté. In contrast, to the defenders of the laws and institutions of the land, they were the constitutional mechanism which was meant to ensure the regime’s compliance with the constitutions on which the Catalan political community was grounded, given the inoperativeness of the constitution of “Observança”.

During that period, the Catalan Diputació, traditionally made up of three deputies, one from each branch (Church, military or nobility, and royal or urban), and socially bolstered by the Juntes de Braços (boards of members from all three branches) and the divuitenes created by virtue of the nou redreç (new reform) of the Courts of 1585, entered a spiral of confrontations with the institutions representing royal power in Catalonia, especially with the third court of the Audience. These clashes culminated in May 1591, when the viceroyal guard tried to capture the military (i.e., noble) deputy, Joan Granollacs, an attempt that failed due to the deputy’s resistance and the grassroots support he received. Granollacs and the supporters of confronting the abuses of royal jurisdiction closed the Palau de la Generalitat for almost eleven months. However, ultimately, the fear that the events in Catalonia might end through the same military might that Philip II had wielded in the alterations in Aragon—which led to the execution of the Aragonese justice Juan de Lanuza, among other actions—did not bear fruit from the Catalan institutions. On the 22nd of February 1593, the Catalan institutions were notified of the suspension of chapters 7, 13 and 34 of the nou redreç from the Courts of 1585. This laws issued by the king and the branches was unilaterally suspended via a Royal Pragmatic. However, there was repression in the guise of legal proceedings against the people associated with the Diputació and the divuitenes, some of whom, such as the military deputy Joan Granollacs, would choose the pathway of exile to avoid arrest.

Thus, at least after the Courts of 1595, a heated jurisdictional conflict was unleashed in which the king believed that the actions of the Catalan institutions usurped different facets of royal jurisdiction, while the leaders of the institutions in the Principality believed that the Crown’s actions contravened the constitutions and laws agreed to between king and kingdom, which were the higher underpinning of the Catalan res publica, as explicitly stated in the royal oath.33 Far from interpreting each other as complementary forces with common interests and reciprocal correspondences, each saw the other as a hindrance or obstacle to their ideals and interests.

The rapprochement of the Courts of 1599, in which the flood of noble appointments by the king was answered by the granting of a donation of 1,100,000 pounds, was a fleeting mirage. The ministry of the Duke of Lerma’s intention was that five constitutions should appear in the legislative corpus that was to be printed from the sessions of the Courts. These constitutions were questioned by the Generalitat and the military branch, which unleashed yet another bitter institutional and legal dispute that led to the imprisonment of the military deputy and auditor.34

In the opinion of John H. Elliott, one of the fundamental keys to explaining the clash between the Catalan institutions and the central government of the Spanish monarchy in the decades prior to the Revolution of 1640 was the difficulty of combining respect for the “legality” of the constitutions with the “needs” arising from political practice. In the early decades of the 17th century, the clearest expression of this contradiction was the issue of the repression of banditry. According to Elliott, the viceroyalties of the Dukes of Alburquerque and Alcalá (1615-1621) were a time of the “restoration of government” given that the stringent, anti-constitutional methods of these Castilian viceroyos— including the large-scale razing of homes and castles— along with the urbanisation of the nobility, had been a key factor in the “domestication” of the Catalan aristocracy, distancing it from the feudal-style private wars.35

To what extent was the disorder and violence that Catalonia experienced in around 1615 the result of a system of...
laws and constitutions at the “service” of a feudal oligarchy? The English historian’s answer is rather conclusive on this issue: “The much-vaunted freedoms of the Principality, far from being a guarantee of political freedom and the social order, had become an invitation to license.”

Unquestionably, inasmuch as certain rights or privileges, such as the right to bear arms or the recourse to violence as a means of exercising certain seigniorial prerogatives, were part of the laws and constitutions of Catalonia, there could be a mixture or superimposition of the exercise of aristocratic privileges and an abuse of the freedoms of the “land”. However, I believe it would be risky to attribute all the political and social upheaval – in which certain bandit lords were unquestionably involved – to a specific social class, and even more erroneous to relate it to the system of laws and constitutions of the country, which, lest we forget it, included a much broader swath of society than just the noble class.

This is because, though it is true that the constitutions of Catalonia may have been an instrument to safeguard certain private or estate interests, it is equally true that they upheld many general and community interests which were often trampled upon by the same royal officials who were fighting the bandit lords. The attacks on the communities that destabilised the social order could just as easily have come from the violence exercised by the bandit lords as by the violence waged by the king’s troops and officials, and we should also add that the tensions caused by the viceroys’ actions not only stemmed from the repression of banditry or the Castilian Spanish state’s mechanisms of extortion but also from certain attempts to politically and nationally pervert the Catalan community.

Likewise, as Eva Serra has noted, the Catalan petty aristocracy’s conflict with the Crown was motivated not only by the criminalisation of the ban on the noble estate but also by the displacement or neglect of its leading role in political life. The viceroys’ repeated violations of the constitutional laws were, among other things, an attack on the political order of the Catalan community, in which the military (nobility) was given a prominent public function.

In the constitutional conflict of 1621-1622 over the oath of Philip IV, the rancour that had been gathering for years among Catalonia’s petty aristocracy finally surfaced, as their pride as a leading class had been injured, especially during the viceroys of Alburquerque and Alcalá. The offensive from the institutions of the country, which claimed that Lieutenants Alcalá and Sentís could not act in their posts until the new monarch swore to observe the privileges and constitutions of the Principality, unleashed major institutional tensions that were accompanied by a sweeping constitutional debate that has been compared to the one that took place in the kingdom of Bohemia in 1619, when its estates deposed Ferdinand II and chose the Palatine elector Frederick in his place.

Clearly, a mixture of the defence of particular class interests and general ideals regarding the desire to move towards a pactist model of state can explain both the upheaval of 1621-1622 and the Catalan ruling class’s steadfast resistance to the absolutist reformism advocated by the ministry of Olivares, which became clear in the failure of the Courts of 1626-1632.

We should also note that the economic differences that may have existed between the king and the Catalan branches on the question of donations were only a reflection of a much deeper political and constitutional divergence. In the Courts sessions of 1626-1632, the gap separating the absolutist reformism of the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares and the renewed Catalan constitutionalism became clear in terms of the reforms of the constitution of the “Observança”, the attempts to scale back the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of the Inquisition, the control of the quinhentos municipal taxes and the articulation of the monarchy through the projection of the “Unió d’Armes” (a contingent of troops that was supposed to maintain Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon).

The failure of the Courts of 1626-1632 led two ideas on the political dynamic of the Principality to take root among the government circles of the monarchy. The first was that the constitutionalist bent of the Catalan institutions, as well as the desire for self-government among Catalonia’s ruling class, were opposed to the basic principles that should prevail to ensure the monarchy’s sound governance. The second was that the political mechanisms were already incapable of correcting or reconducting this situation, and that therefore to avoid greater evils, the combined use of force and politics must be imposed.

The strategy of calling the Courts accompanied by the presence of an army had been broadly debated in the boards and councils of the monarchy since 1632. To some government ministries, it was necessary to first “conquer” Catalonia and then call the Courts, as Philip II had done with the Aragonese, while to others, the intimidating presence of an army would be enough to ensure the Catalan branches’ submission to royal will. However, a detailed examination of these deliberations reveals that there was widespread consensus among the Court ministers on the need for the combined use of force and politics to modify the constitutional balance inherited from the dynastic union of the Catholic Kings. The discrepancies only lay in whether or not to do it at a time when this internal constitutional problem might be mixed with the overarching conflict over European hegemony that the Spanish and French powers were facing. And as is known, this was the strategy ultimately chosen by the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares to put an end to what was considered a rebellion by the Catalans in the summer of 1640.

In short, the political theorisations with unitarist and absolutist tendencies that dominated at the heart of the Castilian court were accompanied by initiatives in the realm of political practice which advocated a combined use of force and politics. This, in our opinion, radically questions the line of interpretation which has recently upheld the existence of a Spanish imperial ideology, sup-
ported on the concept of a “monarchy of Spain” particularly after the reign of Philip II, which would have the benefit of guaranteeing the freedoms and privileges of the territories in it.42

A RULING CLASS DISTANT FROM THE THRONE

One of the decisive features of the political dialectic between Catalonia and the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy was the weakness of the Catalan ruling class’ adherence to the royal power. It should be noted that the most recent historiography on the formation of the modern state has stressed not only that it was difficult to govern against the provincial ruling classes but that it was also difficult to govern without their support.43

In the history of early modern Catalonia, one very important factor was that the two institutions at the helm of the political life of the Principality – the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred) and the Generalitat – had a shared social base of power: the new Barcelona-based ruling class that had taken shape since the late 15th century. The urbanised petty nobility, honorary citizens, merchants and canons of Barcelona, as well as some rising liberal professionals, especially doctors and judges, made up a highly cohesive ruling class which at that time dominated both institutions and steered the fates of Barcelona and Catalonia as a whole.44 Even though at certain times the Crown intentionally strove to break this institutional alliance, and there was no dearth of friction or jurisdictional competition between both institutions, there was generally shared alignment on the issues that affected the underpinnings of the Catalan pactist regime.

This Barcelona-based ruling class was a “composite” elite. Its fundamental core was the urban patricians, the so-called honorary citizens, that is, citizens who were distinguished by their political and economic status, whose rank equalled that of the nobility through a privilege issued by Ferdinand II in 1510. However, this Barcelona-based ruling class was bolstered by the addition of members from both the upper and lower echelons of the body politic. First, it included members of the traditional Catalan nobility – nobles and knights – who had been involved in an intense process of urbanisation since the late 15th century. James Amelang has discussed a “great compromise” through which, between the 16th and early 17th centuries, there was an exchange of social status (the nobility facilitated the aristocratisation of the urban patricians) for power (the honorary citizens allowed the nobility into politics and local government posts).45

However, the Barcelona-based ruling class also had institutional mechanisms in place that made it possible for individuals from the middle class to join it, especially merchants, jurists and doctors. The status of honorary citizen could be acquired either through the system of cooptation, which expanded the rolls of honorary citizens through assemblies held by the patricians every year, or by the citizenship patents granted by the monarch. In short, unlike other European urban oligarchies, the Barcelona elite was open, or at least relatively open.46

Even though there was no dearth of factional partisanship, the Barcelona-based ruling class was highly cohesive through a constant dynamic of marriage ties among its members, as well as by its firm – though not exclusive – social control over the most important Catalan institutions and shared models of political education and culture. The inclusion of numerous family lineages of jurists, as well as the promotion of legal studies among the ranks of the nobility, contributed to strengthening and disseminating among these elites the values of the pactist political model which had secular roots in the production of Catalan law.47

The royal power orphaned this ruling class from “service” and “reward”, as the weakness of royal patronage in Catalonia seems beyond dispute. J. H. Elliott noted the extraordinary precariouslyness of the posts that the viceroy administration made available to a ruling class which was comprised of around 780 people in around 1626. According to this English historian: “It is doubtful whether the central administration had more than twelve posts for members of the aristocracy”, which, to make matters worse, were very poorly compensated economically.48 The weak status of the structure of the royal administration in Catalonia bore a close relationship to the king’s scant tax and capital resources there. In the early 17th century, the viceroy administration’s annual revenues were around 37,000 pounds, which were joined by the 10,000 more that the Diputació contributed to pay the judges and functionaries of the Royal Audience. However, these figures were insufficient since the Crown had to supply 19,000 more pounds from the outside in order to meet the salaries of the viceroy (around 6,000 pounds) and to balance the budget.49

Outside of Catalonia, the Catalan ruling class’s prospects for enjoying royal patronage were hardly better. Neither a military career nor a post in the civil administration of the central government of the monarchy was an easy, generous means of ascent for this Catalan ruling class. Nor were the encomiendas of the major military orders, which were theoretically open to all subjects of the King of Spain, a means of integration and compensation for the members of the Catalan ruling class. In the early 17th century, only 17 of the 1,452 members of the Orders of Alcántara, Calatrava and Santiago were Catalonia natives, that is, less than one percent. As J. H. Elliott noted, “If there was a ‘Spanish’ aristocracy, the Catalans were not part of it”.50

However, the issue of patronage was really only a reflection of a much deeper political issue: the inability of the central government of the Spanish monarchy to establish acceptable levels of integration, communication and political consensus with the Catalan ruling class. The case of the France of Richelieu, Mazzarino and Colbert has been held up as an example of the efficacy of royal patronage – centralised, in this case – which succeeded in the objectives of achieving control over the provinces of
the kingdom while also knitting solid ties between the monarchy and the numerous regional elites, thus strengthening the absolutist and centralising trends of the Bourbon monarchy. The Hapsburg monarchy never managed to forge minimally solid and socially widespread ties of patronage, communication and political influence in Catalonia. The attempts to build these ties via members of the Court like Pere de Franquesa and Salvador Fontanet never managed to achieve either solidity or continuity. However, the attempts to articulate a pro-royal nucleus based on family clans located in the Principality, such as the Marimons, never managed to take hold either, nor did enlisting the services of the upper aristocracy, the Duke of Cardona, to attain the interests and designs of the Crown.

The political marginalisation of the Catalan ruling class and the Crown’s loss of support in the Principality were the flip sides of the same coin. Yet this same period also witnessed a strengthening of the local institutions, which were primarily controlled by the ruling class. Especially after the second half of the 16th century, the Diputació del General and the Consell de Cent became more representative of the Catalan community and less representative of royal power. The strengthening of these institutions – administratively, symbolically and in other spheres – as well as the Generalitat’s promotion of a tax and finance system enabled it to weave a web of interests and complicities around it that extended to broad swaths of Catalan society.

This process reinforced the sense of public responsibility among the Catalan ruling class, making them aware of their steering role in the community of “Catalans” while also creating a hierarchy of loyalties in which the duty to the laws and institutions of the land would be increasingly preeminent.

If we focus on the members of the ruling core in the Revolution of 1640, we can note these individuals’ strong ties with the local institutions. Many of them were members of the military branch while also occupying posts in the Diputació and Consell de Cent in a continuous and/or intergenerational fashion. This contrasts with the volatile or spasmodic nature of their ties with the Crown. In fact, the “rupture” with royal power was common ground among many members of this leading core of the Revolution of 1640, since even though their grandparents or progenitors had been members of the Royal Audience or the Council of Aragon, they were now at the spearhead of a process of rupture with the Spanish monarchy. Just as with Barcelona’s entire ruling class, and Catalonia’s ruling class in general, the elements of their political adherence with the Crown were inconsistent and lacked continuity.

The rupture of 1640

The military factor ultimately provided the fuse and spark that led the longstanding institutional and jurisdictional tensions to explode. After 1635, the French-Spanish struggle for hegemony in Europe turned Catalonia into the war front and parade grounds of the Catholic monarchy. Instead of getting the Catalans to adhere to the imperial designs of Olivares and Philip IV, as many ministers at court wished, this only sparked new constitutional tensions that derived from the irregular billeting of the troops, the illegal mobilisations of the local people and the tax burdens imposed beyond the constitutional limits. After the three-year period of 1638-1641, the Diputació, led by the Canon of Urgell, Pau Claris, started to publicly denounce the throngs and excesses brought about by the massive military presence in the villages and universities of the Principality and countships, which, though not unknown in the past, was now extraordinary in its impact and magnitude.

The political blindness of Olivares’ ministry, which was also pressuring the city of Barcelona with disproportionate and unconstitutional tax demands, ended up leading the two most important Catalan institutions to join forces into a united front against royal policy. This convergence, which was highly visible after January-February 1639, would not be undone during that three-year period and would culminate with the revolutionary process of 1640-1641, an institutional agreement through which Pau Claris would become the political leader of the Catalan ruling class.

The French invasion of Roussillon in June 1639 first led to the fall of Salses and later to a long and costly campaign to win back this fortress perched just over the bor-

Figure 3. Pau Claris i Casademunt (Barcelona, 1586-1641), 94th President of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Image from an engraving from the work Barcelona Ancient and Modern by Andreu Avellà Pi i Arimon, published in 1854.
In the approximately seven months that this military episode lasted, the relations between the institutions and royal power deteriorated extraordinarily, and by January 1640 Olivares’ ministry seemed to have forgotten all the norms of political caution in Catalonia. During the ensuing months, it pressured the peasants and lower class to billet the troops, which was not only exceedingly unconstitutional but was also harrowing for villages which had already suffered greatly. Simultaneously, Olivares’ ministry also made a series of arrests, striving to decapitate — at least politically — the Catalan leaders who had proven to be the most staunchly opposed to the central government’s directives.

The first reaction to this strategy was vehement social outcry. It was initially anti-military and anti-tax, but it soon took on the guise of a class conflict, and the religious tone that the protest soon adopted led it to gain momentum in society.

However, the directives of Olivares’ ministry also prompted a political reaction which led the Catalan leaders, using the force of the popular uprising, to release the military deputy Francesc Tamarit and other prisoners on the 22nd of May 1640. This episode was a milestone in the process of rupture between the Madrid government and the Catalan ruling class, a process that would ultimately prove to be irreversible. Firstly, Olivares and the ministers of Court interpreted those deeds as an unequivocal sign of political rebellion, and thereafter they determined that military intervention was the best means of redressing the situation in Catalonia. Likewise, and this demonstrates that both sides were aware of the political significance of the episode, Pau Claris and Olivares immediately embarked upon separate secret negotiations with France, Catalonia with the goal of exploring the possibility of securing French military aid should a bloody scenario.

The events that transpired on the day of “Corpus de Sang” (Bloody Corpus Christi, 7th of June), with the death of the viceroy-count of Santa Coloma and the persecution of the judges of the Audience, along with the occurrences in Perpignan between the 13th and 15th of the same month, with the bombardment, burning and pillaging of the city by Spanish troops, only served to widen the abyss that opened in late May. With the aim of gaining time to prepare military intervention measures against Catalonia, the Court of Madrid implemented a policy of concealing its repressive intentions, although the Catalan leaders were not hoodwinked.

This twofold game being played by the central government of the monarchy even further hindered any political rapprochement between both sides, since, once the leaders of the Principality became aware of it their conviction that the intentions of Olivares’ ministry were implacably repressive was only strengthened. Thereafter, while Madrid viewed military control of the province as a necessary requirement in order to restore justice and royal authority, to the Catalan ruling classes being freed from military bondage was the only reliable guarantee of both safeguarding the people from the troops and guaranteeing the freedoms and constitutions of their own political system, as well as avoiding a kind of personal and institutional repression which, to their minds, had already been decided upon in government circles.

In mid-August 1640, when the preparations for the army that was supposed to invade Catalonia were already well underway, Philip IV and Olivares publicised this decision along with the monarch’s intention to travel to the Principality to hold Courts and “to restore the trampled justice”. Pau Claris’ political response was twofold and trenchant: first, he reactivated the negotiations with France in order to secure military aid, and secondly, using the same argument of restoring “trampled justice”, he called a meeting of the Junta General de Braços to legitimise and organise the armed resistance to the invasion that had been publicly announced by the Court of Madrid.

However, it should be noted that the first and most desired option for the majority of Catalan leaders was not “separatist” and, in fact, they devised a strategy that included trying to convince Philip IV to desist in his military invasion of Catalonia (by striving to show an inflated military strength that would be reinforced by French military aid). The best option in the minds of the Catalan leaders was to remain the vassals of the Catholic King while saving the land from the hordes of soldiers and ensuring its political system of freedoms and constitutions. Once they were convinced that this would be impossible as long as Olivares and Jerónimo Villanueva were steering the Court’s affairs, they strove to unseat them with an intense letter- and report-writing campaign that culminated in the publication and dissemination of the Proclamación Católica commissioned to the skilled polemicist Gaspar Sala, which explicitly called for Olivares’ removal from office. However, the roots of the political and ideological directives issuing from the government circles (basically reinforcing royal authority and eliminating the roadblocks of any intermediate power in the governance of the monarchy) ran much deeper than what could be derived from the stance of some ministers, the reason this strategy failed.

When Pau Claris called the meeting of the Junta General de Braços on the 10th of September 1640, the Catalan revolutionary process actually got underway, although in political theory it did not take on an explicitly republican guise, since it simply rendered royal sovereignty idle; in political practice, it did act as a fully sovereign power. Between the 10th of September 1640 and the 30th of December 1641 – the date when Louis XIII took his oath on the laws and constitutions of the Principality through Marshal Brezé – the institutional representatives of the Catalan branches appointed officials to impart justice and administer the land; they recruited and organised
a Catalan militia; they implemented and collected new taxes; they coined money; and they turned themselves over to the sovereignty of Louis XIII of France after having broken the bonds of loyalty that bound them to Philip VI.

In the initial impetus of this “republican moment”, Pau Claris focused on enlisting broad swaths of the Catalan body politic by notably expanding the urban and village mesocracies in the popular branch in the Junta General de Braços. To the leaders who had been at the helm of the revolutionary movement, this was both a means of portraying political strength to the Court of Madrid and a way of legitimising and binding most of the villages to the resistance against the royal armies.

Despite the efforts made by the Catalan institutions to organise a military force capable of handling the army almost 30,000 men strong commanded by the Marquis of Los Vélez which threatened to invade Catalonia from the line of Aragon and Valencia, this goal was impossible to reach. Setting up administrative, military and financial structures strong enough to sustain a large-scale war required time, not to mention levels of experience and accumulations of capital that were unavailable at that time. The Spanish army’s violent entrance into the lands of the Ebro River swiftly revealed both Catalonia’s military weakness and the aggressive and repressive aims guiding the Spanish intervention.64

The alliance with France and the liberating victory on Montjuïc (26th of January 1641) would destroy all of the ministry of Olivares’ political and military calculations, since now it was clear that the Catalans’ rebellion would not be easily snuffed out, while it also became clear that the army would be unable to reach the western side of the peninsula to put down the rebellion that had broken out in Portugal on the 1st of December 1640.

Figure 4. Cover of one of the propaganda books on the 1640 Catalan uprising written by Friar Gaspar Sala.

From 1640 to 1714: Wars and “national” shock. The Catalan constitutional controversy in the game of European international politics

The Catalan ruling class’s resistance to the absolutist reformism of the ministry of Count-Duke Olivares and Catalonia’s entry in the great arena of European international politics after its 1640-1641 rupture with the Spanish monarchy had major repercussions on both the process of constructing the modern Spanish state and the balance of international relations in 17th century Europe.

Internally in Spain, the Catalans’ rebellion destroyed the projects being devised by the intelligentsia at the Castilian Court since the late 16th century, which Olivares’ reformist policy of constructing the base of a Spanish state in the former Iberia that was institutionally compact and, at least in the long-term, had a unitary identity, was seeking to put into practice, at least partly. The long, bloody war to “win back” Catalonia from 1640-1652 laid a depth charge to the project of constructing the modern Spanish state, as it broke the bonds of political trust between the Castilian centre and the historical Catalan formation. The perceptions of the causes and development of the process of rupture were different, yet they all led to a feeling of distance and mistrust. In Castile, and especially in the Castilian court, the Catalan and Portuguese rebellion rendered it impossible to establish that compact, well-built, cohesive state designed and run by Castile. In Catalonia, the Spanish unifying project dreamt up by the intelligentsia at court and tested by Olivares had revealed itself to be aggressive and unilateral, as it attacked the Catalan political and national identity. What Olivares had advocated in his 1624 Gran memorial as an ideal or a horizon to attain among the king’s Spanish subjects – the rapprochement of their desires and feelings so that Spain could become a political and national community – was more of a pipe dream than ever.

Although it permeated the political and intellectual debate at the time, the identity factor (with the interplay of Catalonia-Castile-Spain as the fundamental referents) was not what triggered the Revolt of Catalonia of 1640-1652. However, once the hostilities had begun, the “national” factor took on extraordinary momentum and size. The experience of confrontation between “natives” and “invaders”, the spiral of violence and repression and the stimulus of feelings of hatred and separation through war propaganda and the moral and religious sanctions issued by the Church against the outside oppressors largely fed Catalan society with strong Catalan-Spanish and Catalan-French counter-identities.65

In fact, a kind of concatenation or reaction had been unleashed that survived until the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. The political conceptualisation of Spain and the absolutist tendencies of the central government nurtured unifying policies that came upon vigorous resistance in the Catalan political community, which had
matured its own institutional, symbolic-identity and cultural referents during that period. The Spanish military presence in the land sought to achieve the objectives and ideals of a faraway dynasty and a Castilianised political centre, but what it actually fostered was precisely a “national” shock that made any project aimed at identity unification even more unfeasible.

Likewise, in international politics, the Catalans’ revolutionary rupture in 1640-1641 weakened Spain’s positions in other spheres of conflict. The fact that the war to “win back” Catalonia was considered a priority for the Court of Madrid facilitated the victory of the Portuguese secessionist coup while also diminishing the human and economic resources assigned by the Spanish power to the Netherlands and Italy, thus contributing to the definitive ascent of France within European hegemony. This was enshrined by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, which also signalled the partition of Catalonia.

The “return” of Barcelona and most of Catalonia to the Spanish monarchy in October 1652 meant the Catalan institutions’ loss of self-governance. Even though the Court of Madrid considered more stringent repressive options, the continued threat from France meant that the central governing bodies of the monarchy chose to try to control the political life of the Principality by the royal reserve of the vote in the Generalitat and the Consell de Cent, an institutional measure which was combined with a greater Spanish military presence on Catalan soil.66 The leaders were periodically chosen based on a census that was called the Llibre de l’Ànima (literally “Book of Souls”, or book of potential public servants), and the king gave himself the right to exclude anyone who was considered disaffected.

With the royal reserve on the vote, the goal was to launch political mechanisms in which the key institutions in the Principality would be filled with personnel that were docile to the directives issued by the royal power through the mixture of “rewards” and “punishments”.67 However, this would prove to be an unsuccessful means of politically subjugating the Principality. And, in fact, the royal reserve on the vote became a bone of contention which instead of getting the Catalan ruling class to adhere to the political will of the Court of Madrid aroused a spiral of unsatisfied claims and institutional clashes. The aspirations to recover the self-governance lost after the Guerra dels Segadors (Reapers’ War, or Catalan Revolt) were never abandoned by institutional leaders who had theoretically been “chosen” or “screened” by the royal power but who would, in fact, become the core of the political claims that linked 1652 to 1705.68

Even though Barcelona’s ruling class, and Catalonia’s in general, had suffered from the divisions and ravages of the Spanish monarchy in the years since the War of the Spanish Succession, and despite the fact that this negative experience shaped its subsequent political attitude, this ruling class never abandoned a pactist culture with the self-governance of the Generalitat and the Consell de Cent at its core. Likewise, as this ruling class was relatively socially open and had the ability to integrate the most dynamic sectors from Catalan society, the claims for self-governance attained widespread support and were not foreign to the groups who spearheaded the economic transformations in the Principality in the second half of the 17th century.69

The institutions’ desire to win back self-governance is the key to understanding Catalonia’s support of the Hapsburgs in the War of the Spanish Succession. While in 1640 Catalonia’s involvement in the game of European international politics had come about in an attempt to stop the attacks of Olivares’ absolutist reformism, in 1705 it stemmed from the attempt to recover the self-governance lost since 1652. In this sense, Catalonia’s 1705 stance had not a “Spanish” horizon, as the bulk of Catalan historiography has upheld since Ferran Soldevila (Vicens Vives, Pierre Vilar, Joaquim Albareda, Josep M. Torras i Ribé and Josep Fontana, among others) but a Catalan “sovereignist” horizon. The purpose of Catalonia’s 1705 stance was to strengthen the freedoms of the pactist system, which had been curtailed since 1652 and constantly abused by the political practices of the central government of the monarchy. Later, based on that and not a “Spanish” agenda, it sought to build its own political and institutional framework which, once the self-governance lost in 1652 was won back, would be capable of giving an outlet to the energies and dynamism of an expanding economy, as Catalonia’s was in the late 17th and early 18th centuries.70

Yet again, in around 1705, the violence of war aroused “national”-style tensions on an extraordinary basis. The continuation of the war for almost nine years and the practice of Bourbon “military terrorism” as a strategy to subjugate the peoples once again exacerbated the issue of differing identities.71 The final stage in the war was particularly fierce, and the propaganda workshops once again fostered and aired the feelings of hatred and separation between the natives and the foreign aggressors.72

However, while anti-France sentiments predominated in 1705-1706, the war mainly took on an anti-Castilian bent in 1712-1714. The emotional and identity-based abyss opened by the violence of war was now coupled with a conscious “national” feeling that was fairly widespread in society, based on a reluctance to see the local institutions and “freedoms” destroyed to be replaced by alien forms of government led by the ministers from the Castilian court.73 The sum and intertwining of these two factors is surely the key to understanding the widespread, steadfast popular support for the heroic struggle of 1713-1714.

The Onze de Setembre (11th of September 1714) defeat would lead to the establishment of an absolutist political model in Catalonia, which contrasted with the pactist nature of its own historical tradition. This model reflected the political hallmark of the Bourbon dynasty, but it was also the outcome of ideals that sought to politically and
legally construct a Spanish “union” or nation based on the Castilian model, one which brooked no alternative powers or loyalties.

However, even after the repression of the War of the Spanish Succession and the constant military subjugation of the land, one could still detect unequivocal signs of a persistent Catalan national identity throughout the 18th and early 19th century. In short, our analysis of the case of Catalonia in relation to the construction of the modern Spanish state demonstrates that, in addition to the cultural, symbolic and economic-tax factors, the very actions aimed at constructing a unified state that embodied hegemonic designs such as Castile’s plan for Spain, often generated strong identity-based reactions by the other communities included within the same political domain, primarily because of the armed conflicts they unleashed. All of these factors together consolidated the shaping of a national identity in some of these communities, such as Catalonia, which would last even after they were dispossessed by the force of their institutional and legislative structures with medieval origins.

Notes and references


[14] I elaborated upon this topic in Antoni Simon Tarrés. Els orígens ideològics..., op. cit., p. 45-60; and in Antoni Simon Tarrés. Construccions polítiques..., op. cit., pp. 53-133 and 269-286.

[15] This was categorically proven in Salustiano de Dros. "El absolutismo regio en Castilla durante el siglo xvi". Ius Fugit, no. 5-6 (1996-1997), pp. 53-236.

[16] As noted by Joan Pau Rubiés. "La idea del gobierno mixto y su significado en la crisis de la Monarquía Española". Historia Social, no. 24 (1996), pp. 57-81: "From a comparative standpoint, the tragic aspect of the articulation of a Spanish political community was that the constitutional traditions were strong on the periphery and weak in the centre – exactly the opposite of what happened in the United Kingdom". The quotation is from page 81.

[17] Regarding the project to bring Castile’s political and legal system to all the territories on the peninsula, see José García Marín. Teoría política y gobierno de la Monarquía Española. Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Madrid 1998, p. 252, which clearly states: “The fundamentals of what would later be called centralisation, absolutism and even sovereignty, are thus here, in the royal late mediaeval legislation, especially the legislation in Castile. This legislative tradition was what would fruitlessly start the assault on the pactist and federal constitution, inherent to a limited monarchy, of the territories in the Crown of Aragon in the 16th and 17th century. In short, the goal was to impose in them an absolutist, standard system that would unify all the peninsular lands under the imprint of the law of Castile.”


[30] On this episode, see Doris Moreno. Representación y realidad de la Inquisición en Cataluña: el conflicto de 1568. Doctoral thesis. UAB, Barcelona 2002, 2 vols. The “excusat” was the Pope’s concession to the king of the tithe from the best house in each parish.

[31] The divuitenes were permanent regulatory committees on specific topics which after 1585 were made up of eighteen people, six per branch or estate (Church, nobility, bourgeoisie) which reinforced the Diputació del General (Commission of Deputies), made up of one member from each branch.


[40] Regarding the sessions of 1626, see: John H. Elliott, La revolta catalana..., op. cit., pp. 205-233; Eulogio Zudaire. El conde duque y Cataluña. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1964, pp. 44-59; Jesús Vil-

lanueva. “El debate sobre la constitución... ”, op. cit.; An-
toni Simon Tarrés. Pau Claris..., op. cit., pp. 64-68.

[41] I have further examined this topic in Antoni Simon Tarrés. “Cortes y ejército. Cataluña en la estrategia política del ministerio del conde duque de Olivares” (in press).

[42] For this line of interpretation, see: Pablo Fernández Al-
baladejo. “Imperio e identidad: consideraciones histo-
riográficas sobre el momento imperial español”. Semata, no. 3 (2011), pp. 131-150; Eva Botella-Ordinas. “Ex-
empt from time and from its fatal change: Spanish impe-

[43] See the studies compiled by Wolfgang Reinhard (co-
ord.). Les élites du poder y la construcción del estado.


[60] I have interpreted this episode differently (especially the reaction that it incited in the Court of Madrid) compared to the interpretation by John H. Elliott. Cf. Antoni Simon Tarrés. *Pau Clarís...*, op. cit., pp. 252-264.


[62] This reconstruction of the process of rupture between the Court of Madrid and the Catalan institutions follows what has already been set forth in Antoni Simon Tarrés. *Pau Clarís...*, op. cit., pp. 261 and forward.


[68] This thesis is developed in Antoni Simon Tàrrés. Del 1640 al 1705..., op. cit., especially pp. 69-81.


[70] This shift in the interpretative paradigm on the meaning of Catalonia’s stance in 1705 has been examined in Antoni Simon Tàrrés. Del 1640 al 1705..., op. cit., especially pp. 263-313.


Biographical note

Antoni Simon i Tàrrés (Girona, 1956) is a professor of Modern History at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a member of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans (History-Archaeology Section). His avenues of research and publications include historical demographics: Aproximació al pensament demogràfic de Catalunya (1995) and La població catalana a l’època moderna. 10 estudis (1996); the study and publications of the memoirs and personal diaries of the Modern Age: Guerra i vida pagesa a la Catalunya del segle xvii (1986) in conjunction with Antoni Pladellavall; Cavallers i ciutadans a la Catalunya del Cinc-cents (1991); Pagessos, capellans i industrials de la Marina de la Selva (1993); Cròniques del Rosselló. Segles XVI-XVII (1998) in conjunction with Pep Vila; and Cròniques de la Guerra dels Segadors (2003). He is also the scientific director of the portal memoriapersonal.eu; the study of the relations and articulation of Catalonia with the Spanish monarchy: Els orígens ideològics de la Revolució Catalana de 1640 (1999), winner of the IEC’s Prat de la Riba Prize (2003); Construccions polítiques identitats nacionals. Catalunya i els orígens de l’Estat modern espanyol (2005); Pau Claris, líder d’una classe revolucionària (2008), winner of the Serra d’Or prize in Humanities (2009), and Del 1640 al 1705. L’autogovern de Catalunya i la classe dirigent catalana en el joc de la política internacional europea (2011). He has also supervised the Diccionari d’Historiografia Catalana (2003), a work in which more than 250 Catalan, Spanish and international experts have written almost 2,000 articles on historians, institutions, seminal works, journals, schools and trends in the historiography of the Catalan-speaking lands.