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Antiliberal political traditionalism: The Catalan Carlists*

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Abstract

Catalan Carlism was one of the most prominent versions of European anti-liberalism and counter-revolution. This article delves into a debate on the traditional and/or modern nature of the social movements; the relationship between religion, politics and identity; the impact of the civil wars on the construction of nation-states; and the exercise of power and violence. In a context of factories and workers, Carlism built the longest insurrectional guerrilla culture in all of Europe and became the theatre of operations of the "international white".

Keywords: Carlism, counter-revolution, guerrilla, civil war, Catalanism, international white

A long civil war. Carlism and counter-revolution in Catalonia, 19th and 20th centuries

The counter-revolution in Spain is generically called Carlism from the Christian names (Carles/Carlos/Charles in Catalan/Spanish/English) of the pretenders to the Crown. A study of the nature and evolution of Carlism could shed light on the traditional and/or modern nature of the social movements; the relationship between politics, religion and identity; the impact of civil wars in constructing nation-states; and the exercise of power and violence. More than an exhaustive historical survey, we are interested in the response to these challenges. Rethinking the Catalan version of counter-revolution is a good chance to cast doubt on unilinear political pathways.

Carlism represented the space of the traditionalist Catholic and antiliberal right, a European movement comparable to Portuguese Miguelism and the Italian anti-unitarian resistances.[1] No other movement was capable of being an armed alternative for such a long period of time and of receiving such major social support. At the time of the Piedmontese army's entrance into Rome, the Paris Commune and the First Spanish Republic, Carlism was the spearhead of the international white. The Carlist candidate for the Spanish throne was the hope of the exiled courts around Europe.

We shall evaluate five major strands in this text: first, the political trauma experienced by the sectors who chose anti-liberalism with the advent of the liberal revolution; secondly, the Carlist insurrectionist culture in the series of civil wars; third, Carlism's relationship with the Church, the role of political Catholicism and the portrayal of the wars as crusades; fourth, the nature of Carlist foralism; and fifth, the capacity to construct a rich political culture and appear as a lifeline in a turbulent mass society.

The origins of early Carlism and the political trauma of the revolution

The hegemonic discourse in Catalan historiography on Catalonia's supposedly cutting-edge position compared to Spain has hampered a proper understanding of early Carlism. According to this discourse, Catalonia was the "factory of Spain", but the bourgeoisie was frustrated at not having sufficient tools of social control and industrial promotion in an agrarian, militaristic state. In this model, Catalonia was obsessed with Spain's modernisation, confounding the interests of the ruling patriciate in the 18th century and the new bourgeoisie in power on the one hand with the plurality of existing interests on the other.

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The history of Catalonia and Spain was neatly explained in terms of failures and weaknesses, as an expression of the industrialists' and politicians' angst over a supposed historical mission that had to be accomplished, as if Catalonia were the Piedmont of Spain. The scholarly claims around Antoni de Capmany established a canon that marginalised the existence of a diverse range of formulas for handling the crisis. The Catalans were "the Dutch of Spain", as the writer José Cadalso said in 1774. This portrait is similar to the ones proffered by travellers on the Grand Tour, who saw the Catalans as austere businesspeople and religious fanatics. It was an apparent contradiction between tradition and modernity which subsequent historiography has been unable to translate into an understanding of what was actually afoot.

The success of business in the 18th century, within an estate-based society, was interpreted as a positive sign of modernisation. Some wealthy sectors believed that the exhaustion of the imperial system could be combined with solutions that would stave off the fears of revolution. The belief that the Constitution of Cadiz would result in an extension of rights and citizen participation led to the political disquiet of a set of reformist elites. Their behaviour can also be explained as a reaction to the silent antifeudal revolution of the lower classes via their failure to pay tithes and other allowances. These resistances emerged within a climate of broad social violence after the collapse of the state in 1808, which led to a debate on the legitimacy of plebian action against the pusillanimous authorities and landowners. We cannot situate the behaviours of these first reformist and later reactionary elites without grasping the depth of these fears.

One testimony of the diverse range of pathways to modernisation was Ramón Llàtzer de Dou (1742-1832). The teacher of early Carlist leaders and writers, such as Bartomeu Torrabadella and Vicenç Pou, he was a prestigious jurist, the author of one of the most important books on public law and the rector of the university in Cervera, a school that played a prime role in training the elites and defending private law, which was also associated with property transmission. In Cádiz, Dou was the first president of the constituent courts and one of the mouthpieces of the interests of the patriciate, comprised of the petty nobility; merchants of agrarian goods and products manufactured for the northern European, American and peninsular markets; and the Church sector, which was involved in family economies. The success of Catalonia's agrarian economy led to the spread of the institution of the *hereu* and the emphyteutic tax, and this is why Dou suggested that it be extended to all of peninsular Spain as a solution to the structural crisis.[2]

Dou belonged to a patriciate which navigated between the estate-based order and the view of wealth as a category of distinction. He was in favour of the English political and economic model based on landowners' influence in Parliament and the enactment of new political economy laws. He also leaned toward the Dutch model, which criticised excessive spending, luxury and unbridled leisure, vices which would have negative effects by corrupting political forms. In a word, it was a route to capitalism without the fears of the American or French Revolutions. It was a capitalistic Catholic ethics geared at maximum control of political change by bringing the Church into the new framework of economic reforms. What liberalism viewed as the remnants of feudalism the traditionalists saw as institutions that assured a peaceful shift.

Despite this, badgered by the internal conflicts at the university and the radicalisation of political liberalism in Barcelona, Dou ultimately aligned with openly reactionary positions. He and others like him represented an early strategy of moderation and political accommodation. Something similar happened with the influential religious writer Jaume Balmes in the 1840s, when he spotted the class conflict in industrialisation before Juan Donoso Cortés did, alarmed by the social content of the revolutions of 1848. The Catalan historical dynamic led it to lag somewhat behind the Spanish dynamic. Without this, it is difficult to understand how Catalan Carlism followed a different timeframe than its counterparts in the Basque Country and Madrid. In 1846, 1860, 1869 and 1872, Catalan Carlism was at the vanguard of armed Carlism all over Spain, while in 1840 and 1875 the war exhausted itself in the Catalan Principality following rhythms similar to those experienced in the Maestrat and in the north in the Basque Country/Navarra.

Neatly delineating economic and political liberalism is never easy, although the Carlists were the perennial enemies of liberal parliamentarism. In contrast, in terms of economic liberalism, they were against the first wave of disentailments and the troubles caused by the abolition of the seigneurial regime. Several years later, the key factor was the defence of the bourgeoisie itself. The tacit acceptance of the 1851 Concordat, which sanctioned the peace between the Church and the liberal state, led to this new shift. Late in the 19th century, the federal republican politician Valentí Almirall metaphorically described the social leadership of Carlism as "espadrille aristocrats".[3]

The earliest armed antiliberal expressions, such as the royalist uprising of 1822-1823, the Revolt of the Malcontents in 1827 and the First Carlist War between 1833 and 1840, have been viewed as an expression more of economic malaise and coercion than the main actors' political and ideological worldview. Our scholarly shortcomings in political and cultural history have rendered us unable to pinpoint the ideological motivations, religiosity, political identity, monarchism and worldview that the Carlist base and leaders may or may not have shared. Was economic survival sufficient reason to explain repeated affiliation with the cause? How was it possible that Catalonia, a paradigm of modernity, would simultaneously show such social support for absolutism so early on?

In the 1970s, the historians Josep Fontana and Jaume Torras situated the behaviour of the wealthy classes within the logic of capitalist transformations. Understanding

royalism and Carlism depended on an interpretative model of the liberal revolution which posited the lower-class peasants and artisans as the victims, and which avoided the old liberal discourses about a pre-political, fanatical world manipulated by the Church. Those historians were influenced by Eric J. Hobsbwam's *Primitive Rebels*, and the study of the royalist movements took a noticeable turn partly for this reason.

The data that Josep Fontana found when studying the Treasury during the crisis of the Old Regime led him to consider the negative impact that the liberal tax policy had on specialised, market-orientated farm regions. Jaume Torras' research on the Malcontents and the royalist uprising in 1822 and 1923 found that the conduct of the lower classes could be explained not as supporting the old feudal order but as channelling of their frustration against the specific kind of change underway. This experience accentuated the deterioration in their living conditions due to the aggressive tax policy, low agrarian prices and the crisis in domestic industry. This downturn made the social perception of the antagonisms understandable beyond the absolutism versus liberalism dichotomy and enabled him to posit the hypothesis, unexplained still today, that the aspiration to establish a paternal monarchy could attract different bases of support.

In turn, Josep Fontana posited two important hypotheses. The first was based on the distinction between the leaders and the peasant bases, who were arrayed against a common enemy. The second viewed the Carlist territory as a failed, impoverished country compared to the overall prosperity of the 18th century. This thesis was picked up by Ramón Arbanat in a study on the royalist movement during the Liberal Triennium (1820-1823), while Pere Anguera finds the grassroots support of early Carlism to be caused by the social erosion of the peasants and artisans. The people were hungry, and becoming a guerrilla was a way of earning a living in a context where dismay with the clergy had become quite widespread.[4]

The latter two have defined more interpretative lines. Manuel Santirso's defence has stressed the political dimension and economic interests of absolutism, without losing sight of the close connection between war and revolution. The violent, vertical coalescence into factions and battalions allows him to question the sincere support of Carlism. The historian Núria Sauch has developed another line of inquiry on southern Catalan Carlism. This author focused on a particular theatre of operations, namely the lands of the Ebro River and the Maestrat region, in a study that spanned 40 years which reframed the logic of the seigneurial conflicts and the impact of institutional changes in local power. Her study was inspired by the approaches of her teacher, the historian Jesús Millán. They posit that the success of the Carlist wars could not be sustained without the clientele's support of the local elites' initiatives.[5]

The most prolific Carlist writer who published the most successful book on early Carlist traditionalism in 1843, *Las leyes fundamentales de la monarquía española*, was the Mercedarian clergyman Magí Ferrer (1792-1853). He upheld an estate-based political architecture which carved a niche for privileged landowners who were not noblemen. The goal was to give property owners political respectability and representation in the future Courts, to conserve the lead in local power and to allay the negative effects of political upheaval to the extent possible.[6] This position was not very distant from the Catalan responses to the Consultation of the Country in 1809, nor from the ideas of the leading Carlist theoretician in the second half of the 19th century, the Valencian Antoni Aparisi i Guijarro. This class would soon be defined in economic terms as landowners – either longstanding nobility who had seen better days or the "espadrille aristocracy" – without falling into the dangers of national sovereignty or popular participation.

We are unaware of the ideological features of the Catalan counterrevolution beyond the classic support of the Throne and the Altar. Historiography has erroneously thought that the ambiguity of Carlist ideas was deliberately not explicit. The problem has always been ascertaining what lies behind the trilogy "God, Fatherland and King", with the *furs* (charters) tagged on. No systematic analysis has been conducted of either the texts or their authors, or of the agitators or propagandists. Even though many of them were indebted to the schemes developed in France and Italy, the logic of counterrevolutionary national cultures should be explored, including the culture in Catalonia.

The longest civil war in Europe and the Catalan Carlist insurrectionist culture

The Carlist narrative encompasses a long succession of episodes which include the Peninsular War (1808-1814), the royalist uprising of 1822-1823, the Revolt of the Malcontents in 1827 and the First Carlist War (1833-1840), the Second Carlist War between 1846 and 1849, the attempted uprising of the factions in 1855, the frustrated coup d'état in Sant Carles de la Ràpita in 1860, alongside another more spirited uprising in the summer of 1869 and the Third Carlist War between 1872 and 1875. This partisan culture of violence was supposed to enlist the exiled leaders' support for Francis II of the Two Sicilies in 1861 and the intervention as Zouaves in the defence of Rome in 1870. It was one of the longest cycles of war in Europe, comparable to the one in Colombia and the Rio de la Plata, and all of this transpired in a climate of political exceptionalism, a rejection of authority and uprisings against the fifths and compulsory recruitment with the possibility of exemption by payment.[7]

One testimony of the tensions between the military authorities and the people comes from the liberal General Antonio Seoane. The interim Captain General of Catalonia between 1841 and 1842 and a senator for Murcia in

1843, he launched a violent discourse against the uprising in Barcelona in November 1842. In his speech as a senator, he associated the Catalans' rebelliousness with the existence of manufacturing hubs where radical ideas could take root. He claimed that Barcelona needed to be "bled", as if it were an ill person, its industry transferred outside the city and customs established at the Ebro River. In his opinion, hearing talk about independence was much worse than if Charles had proclaimed absolutism. He was a prominent member of the progressive party who anticipated that other phrase uttered by the right-wing politician José Calvo Sotelo in 1935 by almost a century, in which he said he would rather a "roja que rota" [Red than a broken] Spain.[8]

The liberal army was the mouthpiece of the state at a time of institutional collapse and a crisis of legitimacy. The civil wars only fuelled the mistrust between the regular troops and the liberal local militias. In a context with no freedom of press, the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the failure of the Treasury, the army appeared as the ugliest side of the nation, the administration's last bulwark to charge taxes or force military recruitment. With a true lack of division of powers and a state and an administration on the defensive, what was the impact of the civil wars in terms of political nationalisation?

In Catalonia and the Region of Valencia, the *cabdillatge* leadership was part of a rich culture of insurrection. Just as in Latin America,[9] the figure of the *cabdill* (or caudillo, local leader) forged in the war against Napoleon survived as part of the myth of the people rising up in arms which reinforced the discourse of unanimity. In contrast, the *cabdills* were later the target of respectable criticism which blamed them for the delay in modernisation and the lack of institutional stability, if not actually fostering grassroots anarchy and tyranny. In Catalonia, the idealisation did not last too long, especially when the liberal press stigmatised the excesses of the *cabdillatge* during the Second Carlist War.

The episode involving the skull of Charles d'Espagnac, known as the Count of Spain, is indicative of the stereotypes of the *cabdills*. He was not a grassroots leader but the top Carlist military authority who ended up being assassinated by his companions in 1839 with the excuse of his despotism. Liberal public opinion described him as a despot who shot prisoners and burned villages. Against this backdrop, his skull could be studied by phrenologists to define the Southern savage archetype. Once the skull was located by the physicians Josep Soler and Marià Cubí, it was associated with the Araucanians. The Catalan mountain blunderbuss was equated with the criminal Italian brigand and the savage American Indians, a social psychopathology of the reactionary who stood as the enemy of progress. These images were used later against Francesc Savalls, another Carlist *cabdill* nicknamed the "terror of the mountain".[10]

In 1808, an insurrectional culture arose whose epicentre was the guerrilla faction led by the *cabdills*. The leaders of the gangs were vehicles for politicisation and political modernisation and can in no way be considered an anomaly. The Carlist pretenders to the Spanish throne had to mobilise human resources against the liberal regime with a type of combatant who wielded power on behalf of the king in a decentralised network. Historians have not conducted an in-depth analysis of the repercussions of this architecture of power and loyalties. The legitimist leaders conspired through military putsches, expecting the support of part of the military, while leaving the factions with the auxiliary mission of controlling the rural world. Their failure and its conversion into civil war has eclipsed their original purpose. Once the coffers were depleted, the scattered rebellious factions began to coerce taxpayers, which led them to be questioned as the guarantors of order, which was ultimately crucial in gaining support.

A careful look at what happened in between 1846 and 1875, the start and end of the Second and Third Carlist Wars, respectively, helps encapsulate the meaning of this insurrectional culture. The first surprising fact is that the Second Carlist War represents a hiatus in Carlist memory. Few authors spoke about it during the golden age of traditionalist publicity, not even in 1933, when the centennial was commemorated. What predominated was a liberal-leaning discourse that defined the *matiners* as a gang of blunderbusses. This war was unique in several ways. It garnered less support from the Church and the large landowners, perhaps because of the participation of artisans, textile workers and the petty peasant class who were affected by the economic crisis and the central government's measures on conscription and taxes.[11] During the last few months of the war, in January 1849, a manifesto signed by a group of peasants from La Garriga appeared denouncing the debauchery of the parties, which fuelled the "communist" menace in the countryside. This was a false descriptor, but it did equate Carlism with political banditry.[12]

The violence committed during the Third Carlist War was condemned by liberal public opinion. Ridicule of the *capellà trabucaire* (blunderbuss clergyman), news on the destruction of railway and telegraph lines, the burning of civil registries and the felling of freedom trees served to stop the radicalisation of the First Republic from leading to a reaction among the conservative Catholic classes in the countryside. Given that the liberal side's success in this war of images was complete, to what extent was the construction of the liberal state conditioned upon civil wars? The factions carved out experiments in sovereignty which would test the strength or weakness of the state inasmuch as sovereignty, or power, is not solely an attribute of the state but a quality that exists in an array of groups and entities within society. If we agree that the factions and *cabdills* supplanted political authority and hindered the goal of national unity by fragmenting power, their impact on nationalisation processes is unquestionable.

Counter to an overly linear model of *cabdills* and their clientele who hindered the inevitable state centralisation,

civil wars were processes inherent to the construction of nation-states. The legitimate monopoly on strength and fiscal power was questioned everywhere. If we view factions as devices of power that can be used to guide, shape and control behaviours, the *cabdills* participated as nationalising agents in multiple directions. *Cabdills* like Joan Castells, Benet Tristany, Ramón Cabrera and Francesc Savalls represented a type of traditional charismatic authority that channelled the armed protest of the landowners and the grassroots Catholic social base. They represented a model of vertical social relations grafted onto the territory which complemented other forms of regular military organisation. The good gang leaders were part of a structure of exchanges. They provided quick social ascent because without compensation it was difficult to impose deference and obedience to authority. They sought to vie with the liberal administration to exercise the monopoly on violence by kidnapping mayors and prominent taxpayers, blocking trade in villages and shooting adversarial authorities, if needed. The factions also had a strong identity component because they followed one *cabdill* instead of another. In short, it was a type of culture that created a graveyard with the state which was negatively perceived not necessarily by Carlist swaths of the population.[13]

The definitive crisis in this insurrectional culture came in 1875, in an exhausted, disillusioned country. Carlist monarchism ended up weakened by its pretender's fall from grace, with his public and private image tarnished, just as had happened with Queen Isabella II. This bolstered the despotic image far from the intransigent Catholic sectors, which ultimately led to the 1888 Integralist schism.[14] The Carlist king was incapable of handling the exercise of power and the fragmentation of sovereignty.

The Carlist universe was made up of not only major theatres of operations, namely Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque Country-Navarra, and the subjective spaces of war that enabled the war experienced by each person to be recognised, but by two other spaces as well: the northern Catalan frontier and the Carlist court, either in exile or itinerant. This role would not have been possible without the support of the local legitimists, or without the farmers' interest in having cheap labour, regardless of whether it was Carlists or young draft dodgers or army deserters. The protection of the valleys of Andorra played a prominent role in the first half of the 19th century, while in the third war they would remain a traditionalist symbol, a kind of unpolluted sanctuary under the sovereignty of the bishop of La Seu d'Urgell, Josep Caixal. The study of these spaces reveals that they played a more prominent role in the preparations for and course of the conflicts than in the subsequent experience of exile. The northern Catalan Carlists predominated in Salanca, Vallespir, the upper Cerdagne and along the Tec River. In contrast, the city of Perpignan was primarily republican, even though it was the fulcrum of the main conspiracy. Near the frontier, factions were recruited, loans were



Figure 1. Ramón Cabrera i Griñó (1806-1877), Catalan Carlist leader. Portrait of the National Library, Madrid, around 1845.

Figure 2. Francesc Savalls i Massot (1817-1886), leader of the Carlist troops in Catalonia during the last Carlist war. He is wearing the typical red or white beret of the militants of this movement.

negotiated, weapons and equipment were purchased, hospitals and printing presses were set up and Catalan colonies from the south were formed in Perpignan and Ceret.

Another problem came from Carlist emigrants and refugees all over France. The number of exiles was not directly related to the bulk of the contingents because the military circumstances, degree of violence and discouragement led to the amnesty of thousands of men before they took refuge in the neighbouring country. Nor does the tally of combatants quantify all the personnel that passed through the factions and battalions. The number of refugees from the royalist revolt recorded by Ramon Arnabat was 2,200 men in 1823 from a force totalling 13,000; with the entry of Ramon Cabrera in July 1840, the figure of 12,000 refugees is recorded out of a maximum force of 20,000; in 1849, after the Second Carlist War was over, 2,500 accepted amnesty, a notable proportion in relation to the total of 8,000 troops; finally, according to the figures for the last Carlist war that I have compiled, in 1876, 3,000 men out of a total of 12,000 combatants, the maximum that could be sustained by Carlist logistics, lived as refugees in France. Carlists lived permanently in double exile, regardless of whether they lived at home or suffered from deprivation abroad. Inasmuch as their vision of the world was fed by the eschatological struggle between good and evil, Carlists were the victims of their own society's degradation. Carlists suffered from the death of the Catholic nation like nobody else.[15]

The Carlist court occupied an estimable role in Carlist culture because it was able to share an emotional bond with the vicissitudes of the proscribed family. This type of journalistic information was fed by exiles' and conspirators' visits to the core of the cause. The Carlist court was a travelling device of power made up of a small number of members compared to the reigning dynasties. It encompassed the royal family, the House and the Government, made up in turn of political and military secretaries and the field adjutant, and assisted at times by an extraordinary advisor. The collective Carlist imagination throughout the 19th and 20th centuries united the major European capitals, the occasional residences in Paris and London and the palaces and castles of the legitimist families who practised a transnational monarchical solidarity. Carlist geography was scattered around Bourges, Viareggio, Gratz, Trieste and Frohsdorf, as well as the famous Palazzo Loredan in Venice, where the banner salons and private quarters were displayed in magnificent reports in the magazine *El Estandarte Real* between 1890 and 1891 and in the monographic album published by the "Fomento de la Prensa Tradicionalista" in 1907, both printed in Barcelona. Alongside them, the gilded London exile of the Carlist general from Tortosa, Ramón Cabrera, captured public attention for years as he became the prime symbol of grassroots Carlist faith, seldom subordinated to courtly twists and intrigues.

The war as crusade: The relationship between politics and religion in Carlism

Catalonia was a testing ground of the conflicts between the liberal project and the Church project, subjected to the liberal revolution, the papacy of Pius IX and the Catholic reconquest process. It was a society fractured by social inequalities, although Catalonia would also become a "workshop of saints" and a denominational laboratory of the new Spanish Catholicism. Despite this, it would be wrong to apply a rigid model of social change which assumed that the more modern and secular a society was, or the more rational, the lower the presence of the sacred was. Carlism did not suggest a return to the past but an appropriation of modernity. It was not so much a reaction against modernity as a product of a modernity which felt alien. It was not so much a secularisation process as a weakening of the role of religion as a social glue.

In the late 18th century, unlike the Spanish discourse that strictly defended the Catholic monarchy, the leading Catalan groups sought to articulate the ideal of the commercial empire with Catholic ideals. However, faced with the threats to the conservative order of families and properties, the Church's response was extremely reactive. The Catalan hierarchy was more sensitive than the rest of the episcopacy to the surveillance of the tribunal of the Inquisition as a tool of ideological control in the ruling dated 12 December 1812. The Church emerged severely harmed by the government measures aimed at wiping out the chronic public debt and earning revenues to pay for the wars in the peninsular and overseas territories. It was affected not only in the jurisdictional realm but also socially and economically. Between 1820 and 1840, the secular clergy was less absolutist than the regular clergy, the clergy in the cities less than those in the countryside, and the parish clergy less than the local clergy. The Catalan Church's main affiliation was first royalist and then Carlist.[16] In the second half of the century, most of the hierarchy remained at the ready, while the parish clergy sided with the Carlist bloc and became politicised in the ultramontane sense.

The Church was the institution that was damaged the most. It lost three-fourths of its income with the elimination of the tithes, first fruits, the laudemium and taxes. This was a total setback caused by the disentailments of religious assets and the elimination of monasteries and corporations, which spurred most Catalan bishops to react. There was indeed a minority of ecclesiasts who were liberal, but at times of revolution the Catalan Church leaned towards the absolutist and Carlist side. During the royalist revolt in 1822, only the bishops of Barcelona and Girona were not absolutists, but by 1837, during the first war, the bishop of Barcelona was the only one who remained faithful to the liberals. Even Pope Gregory XVI appointed Bartomeu Torrabadella to serve as deputy apostolic delegate in Catalonia; he had been a canon of Barcelona, chancellor of the university in Cervera and a disciple of Ramón Llàtzer de Dou. He was an extremely

prominent leader and a link in the chain of weapons purchases and war financing between the king of Sardinia, Charles Albert I, and Catalan Carlism.

With the consolidation of bourgeois society, the relationship between politics and religion coalesced. The ecclesiasts not only spent their efforts preventing the advance of liberal culture, but they also sought to rectify governance so that Catholic civil society would determine political and moral decisions. With this purpose in mind, one of the most renowned writers, Jaume Balmes, advocated marriage between the Carlist pretender, the Count of Montemolín, and Queen Isabella II. The operation would marginalise the political game of the progressive wing of liberalism, leave behind the divisions of the civil war, acknowledge that it was impossible to restore the previous order and compromise with the spirit of the era. This roadmap was targeted not only at the modern Catalan bourgeoisie but also at the rank-and-file Carlists.[17]

Jaume Balmes had a hand in the abdication of Carlos Maria Isidro, and he probably wrote the manifesto addressed to the Spaniards' new pretender from Paris in May 1845. Even though Balmes' direct involvement in Carlism was brief, the traditionalists protested it. The type of priorities held by the Catalan conservatives was also telling. Unlike their Spanish counterparts, who were capable of building bridges with the progressives, the Catalans curtailed their constitutionalism and defended religious unity, which was what glued the Catalan right to the side of Carlism. While the bloc in power in Madrid included the two branches of liberalism, in Catalonia the aspiration was to unify the Catholic right because religion was believed to be the solution to meet the challenges of industrial society. And for this very reason, it had to be transformed into a modern, effective instrument.

The Catalan ecclesiasts who embraced the cause of Charles played a key role in building the propagandistic apparatus, promoting and leading a powerful pro-Vatican sector and updating the Catholics' forms of mobilisation. The list of figures is quite lengthy. The most prominent names are Josep Caixal i Estradé, founder of the Llibreria Religiosa with Father Antoni Maria Claret, future bishop of La Seu d'Urgell and military vicar general of the Carlist armies throughout all of Spain; Francesc Palau i Quer, the former Carmelite founder of the Escola de la Virtut in 1851 and the inspiration behind the Carlist eschatological climate; the young Fèlix Sardà i Salvany, founder of the *Biblioteca Popular* in 1870 and the Apostolat de la Premsa and the author of a subsequent bestseller, *El liberalismo es pecado* (1884); the priest Josep Escolà i Cugat, founder of the Acadèmia Mariana in Lleida in 1862; and prominent laymen like Ramón Vinader, Lluís Maria de Llauder and Josep Maria Carulla. Nor can we downplay the Carlist sympathies of Cardinal Isidre Gomà, one of the archpriests who lent the most wholehearted support to the coup d'état against the republican legal order in July 1936.[18]

This sector participated in the Catholic social reconquest in the 1860s, that is, in the first culture war against free thinking through the "good press", Catholic academies and youth groups, gatherings, pilgrimages and popular theatre. Carlism grafted itself onto the ultramontane sector of the neo-Catholic followers of Juan Donoso Cortés. Their success was so resounding that even though they were defeated in the Third Carlist War, the equation between traditionalism and defence of religion was confirmed in the Catalan bishops' response to the apostolic nuncio's survey in 1881. The good Catholic was a Carlist.

The defence of Pope Pius IX occupied the political agendas of European governments, while the faithful viewed it as a tragic crisis of civilisation. The Catholics' veneration of the cause of Pius IX unleashed a cult of personality, a veritable "papolatry", where the pontiff was held up as the modern-day continuation of the early Christian martyrs. The Catholics had fertile grounds for spreading the belief that the Carlist uprising in April 1872 was the start of a crusade. The creation of a battalion of pontifical Zouaves in Catalan territory, an ultramontane militia fed by legitimists from all over Europe, materialised the existence of a Catholic-monarchical international white which viewed Charles VII of Bourbon as the Catholic prince who would liberate Spain and Rome.[19]

Figure 3. Charles VII, pretender to the throne of Spain, in the last Carlist war (1872-1876). Representation taken from Antonio Pirala, *Historia Contemporanea, Segunda Parte*. Volume two, Madrid, 1892.

The prophetic, eschatological Carlist arguments make it possible to spotlight the kinds of solutions set forth to deal with the major cleavages that were splintering society. To the antiliberals, the times were conditioned by Providence, which used traumatic events – revolutions – as a testing ground and a chance to expiate sins. Liberalism was yet another link in the long chain of Mankind's attacks against God. Catastrophe could only be avoided with a return to Catholic civilisation. The Carlist utopia was the first step in a providentialist restoration prior to the social reign of Christ. This was the position upheld by the most influential author in Catalan Carlism at the end of the century, Lluís Maria de Llauder, and it is related to the subsequent prophetic revival in the revolution of 1868. The struggle between Good and Evil, us or them, everything or nothing, explains the high degree of violence in the lands where the fight with the federal republicans was the fiercest. It should come as no surprise that an agent of the pretender advised him that "*si se retarda el levantamiento perderemos muchos, que se pasan a la Internacional*" ("if you delay the uprising, we will lose many who will go over to the International").[20]

Provincialism and codes of law. The fit between Catalonia and Spain

Grégoire Wyrouboff was a crystallographer born in Moscow, a disciple of August Comte and a defender of positivism in France. He compiled his travel notes from a journey around northern Spain and the Ebro River in 1874 in a brief work. He wanted to run Spain's backwardness through the filter of his scientific mind. Neither the defence of religion nor the defence of the king were sufficient motives to explain the survival of Carlism, and he pinpointed the problem as Vizcaya, Navarra and Catalonia's lack of harmony with the state. Political centralism had not triumphed under either the monarchy or the republic. In contrast, Spain was ripe for a federate regime because it was a plural country in terms of its languages, habits, traditions and geographic and industrial conditions: "*l'Espagne est une unité factice qui ne correspond à aucune réalité effective. De l'Andalousie à la Catalogne, de la Castille à la Biscaye, il y a au moins autant de différence que de l'Italie à la France, de la Belgique à la Hollande, de la Bohème à la Hongrie*". There was at least as much difference among the Spanish regions as there was among some European states. It would be difficult for any government, Wyrouboff observed, to sustain "*sous la même loi*", societies with such opposing political traditions.[21]

We suggest three phases in the evolution of the political identifications of Catalan Carlism: the one that sought a monarchy of provinces, the one that opposed the centralising efforts of the liberal state, and the one that would experience the hegemony of Catalanism in the early 20th century. In order to peer into the worldview of the early Carlists, we shall use the word "provincialism", a term that defines the demands for attention to provincial interests – related to the Principality of Catalonia – aired by members of the Catalan ruling class in the transition from the 18th to the 19th centuries, taking the province as a subject of decision-making and political representation, with a conception of sovereignty and nation closer to the territorial distribution of power than the functional distribution of the state.

One of the first objectives of provincialism was to attain representation and interlocution with the Crown. This demand appeared in the summons to the Courts in 1760 and 1789, during the constituent process and application of the Cadiz text, in the course of the Royal Statute and in the drafting of the 1837 constitution. In those sessions, just as had happened with the deputies from the Americas between 1810 and 1813, it was common to have to apologise for bringing up provincial problems to avoid being labelled selfish for not focusing on the general problems of the nation. The word provincialist had pejorative connotations.

Carlist political provincialism could harmonise with the historical will of the Catalan ruling class in order for Spain to become a Catholic, commercial monarchy comprised of provinces, more concerned with the recovery and preservation of the constitutions (*furs*) than with the constitutional revolution. The rules of obedience and deference to the monarch made it unimaginable for this kind of request to be made on their own initiative outside the established channels other than in time of political exceptionalism, such as the one prompted by the power vacuum in the summer of 1808. Provincialism cut across ideologies and was accepted by liberal sectors as well, as Jordi Roca has revealed, a liberalism like the moderate Barcelona variety that was concerned with articulating the liberal Spanish nation through the Catalan constitutional culture of rights and freedoms, which the Diputació Provincial de Catalunya legitimised in 1820.[22] Throughout all those years, the range of proposals from provincialism included the opening of provincial Courts, the defence of the Catalan laws in force, the return of its own laws and constitutions and trade prohibitionism. The radical, democratic left shared elements of this culture in the unrest in the 1830s and 1840s and in the attempts to demolish Barcelona's Ciutadella.

Catalonia's responses to the 1809 Consultation of the Country were part of this provincialist culture, as was the final report written by Antoni de Capmany, which defended the modernity of the institutions that had been lost a century earlier. The same holds for the rulings of the Junta Superior de Catalunya written in 1810 by the jurist and later deputy Felip Aner d'Esteve, which asked for the *furs* and rights that the Catalans had had during the Habsburgs' reign to remain in place, a claim which the pro-French deputy Josep Garriga had made shortly before in Bayonne. Years later, in 1836, the spokesman of the progressive group in the Courts, Domingo Maria Vila, pro-

posed that the *fueros* of Basque and Navarra be extended to all of Spain.

In short, it is mistaken to assess Carlist foralism based on the silence of the first two Carlist pretenders to the crown or the negative judgement of it by Catalanist culture in the early 20th century. It was a kind of foralism concerned with preserving the existing *furs*, such as private law, and with opposing the introduction of new taxation and conscription systems. And to do this, they had the legal arsenal of the former constitutions and customs at their disposal. When the historian Pere Anguera wondered whether there had been a Catalan Carlist proto-nationalism, he responded negatively. And we think that he was right, but only in part of the problem. The proclamation that Benet de Plandolit-Targarona signed in the Eastern Pyrenees in October 1834 referred vaguely to the king's promise to "*guardar los antiguos privilegios de este Principado*" (safeguard the old privileges of this Principality), but this meant preserving laws that were still in force, not those abolished in 1714. Despite the rumours or attempts to bring this reversal to fruition, the responses from the Carlist leaders near the king were always negative: they were negative in 1836 when Carlos Cruz Mayor, the Minister of State, categorically refused to restore the *furs*, and in 1848 when Manuel Cubells, a close associate of the Count of Montemolín, opposed Tomàs Bertran i Soler's plans for a provincial council.[23]

Until 1869, Carlism was reluctant to touch the political architecture that the Bourbons had imposed in the 18th century. The fact that there was a critical interpretation within Carlism of the centralisation process carried out by the dynasty is another matter entirely. Sectors in favour of reformist absolutism wanted to preserve the foral laws, which were running the danger of vanishing with the enlightened "national law" and the liberal codification. In this climate, a French military officer remarked on the Revolt of the Malcontents in 1827: "*il ne faut pas chercher la cause de cette guerre ailleurs que dans le caractère national des Catalans, qui tiens à leur législation*" [there is no need to seek the cause of this war anywhere else than in the national character of the Catalans, who have their legislation].[24] That is, the cause lay in their constitutional culture.

Others went further, such as the Mercedarian priest Magí Ferrer in the aforementioned work, *Las leyes fundamentales...*. This author believed that defending absolutism did not necessarily have to mean defending a despotic, tyrannical king. Like a good man of the Church, he believed that the absolute king could not reign absolutely. The author adduced the restoration of the fundamental laws and ancient freedoms, disapproved of the policies of the first Bourbon and claimed that if Philip V had maintained the *furs/fueros*, the influence of the old hierarchies – nobility, Church and landowners – would have quelled the philosophical doctrines.

Just after the Carlist defeat and the enactment of the 1841 Compromise Law in Navarra, Magí Ferrer proposed establishing provincial courts with their own laws and taxation. It is telling that he framed the debate in provincialist terms. Under the pretext that in Spain everyone had to be Spaniards – Magí Ferrer wrote – he proclaimed that "*antes que provincianos, somos españoles*" (before provincials, we're Spaniards). The liberals were predicting that provincialism would endanger or break "*el vinculo de la unidad monàrquica, o según el estilo republicano, de la unidad constitucional*" [the bond of monarchical unity, or in the republican style, of constitutional unity].[25] In any case, Carlist provincialism was not an improvisation, and the issue of the *furs* was not a minor one, despite the Carlist leaders' allergy to it. Nor was liberal Basque provincialism in the defence of its own *fueros*.

Once the liberal queen Isabella II was dethroned in September 1868, a new phase was ushered in. Decades of state expansion were a thing of the past, and a new era started in which the demands of decentralisation or shared sovereignty cut across Catalan politics. The Carlist formula was twofold: a Spain comprised of foral provinces following the model of Basque-Navarra, and the return of the *furs* to the territories in the former Crown of Aragon. The "Letter-Manifesto" that Charles wrote to his brother, Alphonse of Bourbon, dated 30 June 1869 in Paris and penned by the writer Antoni Aparisi i Guijarro, is the most influential programmatic text in fin-de-siècle Carlism. The document states that the Spanish people had always loved decentralisation, and that the king's will was not to downgrade the Basque *fueros* but for the remaining provinces to match them in terms of their internal laws, albeit adapting them. This was the clearest expression of the shift in direction of the Carlist authority until the start of the war. The manifesto was not explicit recognition of Catalan *furs* but maintained the discourse of the monarchy of provinces.

We would be wrong if we thought that Catalan Carlist foralism always trailed on the shirttails of the pretender's initiative. Foralism cannot be reduced to royal documents and the defence of the Basque and Navarran *fueros*. Those years witnessed an upsurge in the Catalan issue of forality via electoral manifestos, parliamentary speeches, lectures in circles, books in a historical tone and popular leaflets. One of the prime explicitly foral expressions came from the young ultra-Catholic lawyer and journalist Lluís Maria de Llauder in his address to the electors in the district of Vic in January 1869, therefore prior to the Charles' letter. The goal was to restore the *furs* while making them compatible with modern life. By doing so, centralisation could be halted, the administration would be moralised and the fifths (the conscription of every fifth young man by lottery) would be eliminated. In other articles, he stressed that the *furs* would not only rectify the centralising process but were also a Catholic alternative to republican federalism. This is an important issue if we want to understand the main players' political grammar beyond the judgements that historians may make. The rivalry between the foralists and the federals during the Sexennium

would be reproduced with the Catalanists during the Restoration.

During those years, a juridical and historical literature appeared which evoked the religiosity of the Catalans and the goodness of their parliamentary institutions. They include works like the ones by the Girona lawyer Narcís Blanch, the canon of Barcelona Mateu Bruguera and the anonymous leaflet penned in Catalan entitled *Los catalans y sos furs. Llibre editat per un fill de la terra*, which was written in a colloquial language to attract a grassroots audience. Allusions to the *furs* appeared in parliamentary speeches such as the one by the Carlist lawyer and deputy for Girona, Emili Sicars, who on 27 May 1871 condemned the Bourbon dynasty personified by Philip V for the loss of the *furs* and the problems brought about by the fact that the magistrates, prosecutors and trial judges were unfamiliar with the language and particular laws of Catalonia. This also arose in the speeches by Joan Mestre i Tudela, the former mayor of Lleida and future vice-president of the Carlist deputation, at the opening of the Catholic-monarchic circle in his city on 3 January 1869, one of the first in Catalonia to join the cause. In his address, he said that conscription and the tax system, the fifths and the taxes on general food consumption, were the outcome of the liberal policies that the *furs* sought to remove.

Between 8 April and 16 July 1872, the date when the first factions appeared and the return of the *furs* was announced by Charles, news reports gleaned from the calls of the Carlist groups at the entrances and exits of the villages started to appear in the press. With no attempt to list them exhaustively, the slogans included "Long live the Catalan *furs*!", "To Don Carlos and Religion!", and calls to expel the foreign king, Amadeus of Savoy, mixed in with calls of "Long live Spain!". We have evidence that on 1 May, the faction of Guerxo de la Ratera faction did this in Agramunt; on 30 May the faction of Francesc Savalls did so in Sarrià de Ter; one day later, the faction of Quico de Constantí followed suit in El Vendrell; on 1 July the faction of Camats in Vilanova de Meià; and on 22 June the former deputy for Torroella de Montgrí, Joan Vidal de Llobatera, did so in Santa Pau, even though one year earlier he had given a speech to the electors in his district that was respectful of the *furs*. From north to south and westward, foralism was displayed in rituals of political affirmation and spread far and wide before the proclamation was published in the Barcelona and Madrid press in late July and early August 1872.

The document stating the return of the *furs* in July had two parts. The first was a statement of intentions which referred to the "Letter-Manifesto" and was addressed to Catalans, Aragonese and Valencians, in this order, informing them that Charles was giving back to them what his ancestor, Philip V, had erased as a reward for their loyalty. In the summer of 1872, there had been a failed attempted uprising in the northern region of the Basque Country-Navarra, while the only territory where the insurrection persisted was Catalonia. This is one of the countless pieces of evidence that revealed that Catalan Carlism was not peripheral in the overall history of Carlism. The second part of the document is an important selection of the main Catalan *furs* revolving around the commitment to Catholic unity, the fiscal sovereignty of the Diputació General and the Catalan Courts, the elimination of the fifths, attention to the municipal regime and the country's juridical physiognomy. The goal was no longer merely to maintain Catalan law or find a provincial accommodation but to restore and adapt the former Catalan *furs* within the framework of a composite Catholic monarchy. Immediately thereafter, from Tarragona, the Madrid-based Carlist newspaper *La Esperanza* wrote on 29 October that the youths were presenting themselves "*en demanda de fusiles para combatir en favor de los fueros de Cataluña*" [demanding rifles to fight in favour of the *furs* of Catalonia], and that unlike the liberal Catholics, the fatherland's traditions cannot be invoked unless the *furs* were defended.

Not all Spanish Carlist leaders agreed with the step that the pretender took. The Carlist chief of staff Hermenegildo Díaz de Cevallos, a prominent agent in Northern Catalonia, thought that it was a dire mistake that could erase what the dynasty had achieved on behalf of Spain's administrative unity. The liberal press in Madrid, such as *La Época*, warned that foralism was drawing dangerously close to republican federalism, destroying the efforts of the Catholic Monarchs and setting national unity ablaze. Even the Madrid correspondent of the *Diario de Barcelona* distinguished positive administrative decentralisation from what was tantamount to a rupture in national unity, which would mean as many governments as there were provinces in the state.

The reception by the federal republican press differed in Barcelona and Madrid. In the summer months of 1872 and the second half of 1874, the liberal and republican press in Barcelona debated the validity and sense of this foralism with journalists and historians. The relationship with republicanism did not end there. A letter from Vic to *La Esperanza* dated 20 August 1872 celebrated the fact that all of Catalonia had turned republican since Charles had restored the *furs*. The *furs* "*no son cosa más que una República muy bien ordenada a la libertad verdadera y al alivio positivo del pobre y menesteroso (...)*" [are nothing other than a Republic strongly ordered towards true freedom and the positive alleviation of poverty and want (…)]. The Republic of the *furs* was the Republic of God, a model where Catholicism strengthened the traditionalist – not despotic – interpretation of Carlism.

The establishment of a deputation in Sant Joan de les Abadesses in the winter of 1874 was the outcome of a series of conditions. Catalan Carlism was experiencing a growth crisis, with military victories yet serious governance problems. Comings and goings of commissions of politicians and large landowners in the royal barracks had been common since late 1873. Despite the king's decision to create a Deputation of Catalonia in May 1874, the op-

Figure 4. *La Flaca*, 14 August 1869. The satirical Barcelona magazine *La Flaca* wanted to denounce that the Catholic Church continued to be subsidized by the state in 1869 and at the same time was supporting the Carlists, enemies of liberalism.

eration was merely administrative and therefore insufficient. Once again, Catalan pressures were viewed negatively. Two days after prince Alphonse of Bourbon received a committee of Carlists demanding a political solution for the Principality in an audience in Solsona, he wrote to his brother in severe terms. He notified him that a group of landowners wanted a governing board to appoint local authorities and collect taxes, "*y todo no es más que para trabajar a la Independència de Cataluña. Lo que los catalanes desean, bajo la palabra Fueros, es declararse independientes de España. Esto me consta por varios conductos, y esto es lo que siempre yo preveia y de lo cual no dudé nunca*" [and all of this is nothing other than working for the Independence of Catalonia. What the Catalans want, under the word *Fueros*, is to declare themselves independent from Spain. This has been shown to me in different conducts, and this is what I always predicted and what I never doubted]. Alphonse's imperial, uniformist vision had its adherents. One Carlist border agent, Josep Maria Galí, wrote to Charles' military secretary, Guillermo Estrada, telling him that the Carlists were demanding too much, "*casi la omnipotència y la inmortalidad*" [almost omnipotence and immortality], and that "*las tendencias antiautoritarias*" [the antiauthoritarian tendencies] of the *furs* had to be contained.[26]

The pressures from the landowner boards meeting in Olot and Vic forced the pretender to issue a decree in Estella dated 26 July 1874 establishing a War Deputation. On 1 October, the decision was made public by the veteran general Rafael Tristany; one month later he moved to Sant Joan de les Abadesses, and his action there lasted until the siege of La Seu d'Urgell in August 1875. In the early days of October, official acts were held in Olot, La Seu d'Urgell and Vic which the Deputation interpreted as working towards the return of the *furs*. This was the gist of several articles in the Carlist press which called for martyrdom for the King, Religion and Catalan freedoms. The public display of the portrait of Charles in Olot, decorated with inscriptions like "Fora quintes, Visca la Unitat Catòlica i Visca el Rei don Carles VII '*restaurador de los fueros de Cataluña*' [Away with the fifths, long live Catholic Unity and long live the King, Charles II, restorer of the *furs* of Catalonia] was laden with strong symbolic value. The Deputation was led by 16 councillors, prominent men from the earlier political and electoral Carlism. Their authorities included administration and political representation, control of taxation and justice (a Regional Court), public order with the return of the local police force (the *mossos d'esquadra*) and the management of hospitals and communications. Despite the mockery from the Madrid press, the experience was quite real. In February 1875, the liberal military officer Arsenio Martínez Campos, then the captain-general of Catalonia, reported to his contacts on the frontier between the Carlists and the federal republicans about an alliance consisting in granting the *furs* and "*una autonomia administrativa, con aumento de jornales y disminución de horas de trabajo, con objeto de ganarse la causa obrera*" [an administrative autonomy, with an increase in day wages and a decrease in working hours with the goal of winning over the working-class cause].[27]

Catalan political Carlism until the advent of mass society, 1868-1936

Historians have made the mistake of seeing Carlism late in the century as a secondary actor in politics. Our knowledge of monarchism still falls short, even though as a country, Catalonia was as republican as it was monarchic.

Nor have we sufficiently valued the rich, extensive Catholic socialisation. The conflict between the free thinkers and Catholics was a long-term cleavage throughout Europe. Between 1869 and 1872, or between 1876 and 1888, the Carlists were prime actors in Catholic socialisation. Catholic action was their sphere of action, even as it detracted from Carlism's projection in the new spaces within mass society. With the consolidation of the Restoration in 1876, Carlism had to wait patiently. The military defeat was also a political defeat inasmuch as the public image of the king was marred by the discrepancies with the Church and desacralised by the family and sex scandals.[28] The years full of apocalyptic pronouncements were a thing of the past. According to the eschatological view of time, Carlism had to wait for the arrival of new symptoms of the exhaustion of the liberal system. This is what Lluís Maria de Llauder thought when he was the head of the Catalan Regional Carlist Board upon witnessing the colonial overthrow in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898.

The Carlist party would continue capturing action and propaganda platforms until the Integralist schism of 1888. Then, but not before, was when it lost part of the personnel who backed Charles in 1868. And in 1890, when the Marquise of Cerralbo was appointed delegate king of Spain, the party was rebuilt according to a model cast in the mould of the Associació Catòlico-Monàrquica of 1870, with boards, press and socialisation centres. It is mistaken to present fin-de-siècle Carlism as a "new" Carlism because the underpinnings of the party's modernisation, socialisation and political culture dated back to the Democratic Sexennium. It is equally mistaken to think that the new personnel in 1868 used it as a counter-revolutionary umbrella and discarded it when they were defeated.[29]

The crisis at the end of Isabella's reign revived a cause that had seemed dead. Carlism was a political label without an organisation, a "religious-monarchical communion", as Josep Maria Carulla[30] has defined it, with a little-known pretender. A modern political alternative of extraordinary consequence in Catalan society was constructed in short order. It occupied the electoral space on the right and virtually monopolised the Catholic cause against the backdrop of the anticlerical offensive. Despite the caricature of the pre-political illiterate peasant, the Carlist leadership ranks were filled by young, urban lawyers in frock coats. Even the first faction to head out on campaign on the night of 7 to 8 April 1872 did so from the plain of Barcelona.

Former anti-Catholic mayors from Lleida, Vic, Girona, Tortosa, Olot and Balaguer joined the "new" Carlist cause. After 1868, and more specifically after 1870, it virtually moulted its political structures. It equipped itself with numerous social centres and committees of prominent men with the mission of attacking the institutions by means of electoral combat, propaganda and, if needed, a coup d'état. It was a modern party model in the European context comparable in density to the republican party and more advanced than the remnants of the moderates and the governing progressive liberal party. The design featured the veteran *cabdill* Ramon Cabrera shortly before he resigned, taking England's Tory party as its model.[31]

Catalan Carlism did not reflect the ideal party type. The leadership structure was more reminiscent of a confederation of prominent men, and even though it was not entirely so, nor was it a party of the masses. Perhaps it was the first attempt at a cadre party in Catalonia, which evolved during the Restoration towards a more complex organisation with a rich social and territorial base aimed

Figure 5. *La Flaca*, 4 September 1870. The caricature features a chaplain with the blunderbuss harangue the Carlists characterised as a flock of sheep. The motto "Dios, Patria y Rey" characteristic of this movement can be seen.

at cultivating a community alterity to liberal society. There was no correlation between its rootedness and its scant representation in the parliamentary institutions, among other reasons because they could not control all the tricks of electoral corruption.

This Traditionalist Communion was organised in a pyramidal structure, with a Central Board for all of Spain along with provincial, district and local boards. Between 1870 and 1872, at least 166 boards were established throughout Catalonia, 89 of which were in the province of Girona, while 902 were created in Spain. Its deep penetration in Girona contradicts the assertion that the boards were not very representative. When Carlism reorganised under the leadership of the Marquise of Cerralbo and Lluís Maria de Llauder in 1892, there were around 1,000 boards, 197 in Catalonia alone. These figures would increase until they were disbanded by government repression from 1899 to 1900. Since their creation, they played a key role in establishing the party locally, in calling for elections and in legally defending the candidates. Unlike the Restoration, some supporters also worked in the underground armament boards preparing for the coup. In retrospect, the model was similar in both periods, although in the Restoration there were regional boards which coordinated all the others.

The concept of political culture may be useful in further exploring the grammar of Carlism, what it thought and especially how its members experienced identification with a political agenda. We view political culture as the sphere that analyses the attitudes, beliefs and values shared by the individuals comprising a group. Historiography has not sufficiently stressed the cultural and discursive values that the Carlists conferred on politics. For some years, we have known that they constructed a rich repertoire of symbols and vocabulary, with a report, a commemorative calendar and an alternative pantheon to the romantic liberal hero archetypes. Between 1869 and 1872, the political and symbolic patterns of the king and his family were updated, and modern propaganda instruments were adopted. The male symbol of the beret was joined by the female symbol of the daisy, the female section of Carlist traditionalism. At that time, galleries of illustrious veterans were published in an amalgam of Catholic and Carlist martyrdom. This operation would extend throughout the Restoration and culminate in 1896 with the celebration of the tradition's annual festival of martyrs every 10 March.

In 1868, a portrait of the pretender was constructed following the virile archetype of the Catholic gentleman and good breadwinner who was paternalistic toward his subjects. This signalled the start of pilgrimages to spaces of memory in exile, such as the one recounted by the writer Josep Maria Carulla. The journeys to palaces and "sanctuaries" like the one in the chapel of Saint Charles in Saint Justus cathedral in Trieste anticipated the pilgrimages to Palazzo Loredan in Venice late in the century. They were years when the political language was updated, when the pejorative "sipai" (sepoy) was used for local liberal volunteers, comparing them to the indigenous servants of the English in India. The Carlist political culture contained an entire conception of the world, a *Weltanschauung*, which materialised in the popular consumption of matchboxes, playing cards, wine and liqueur labels, decorated fans and calling cards bearing the portraits of kings, alongside prints with the images of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Immaculate Conception.

The commemorative festivals in the post-war Catalonia of 1876 were a test of this political culture because they were not the same everywhere. Liberal and republican festivals commemorating the dead or the defences of towns like Igualada, Collformic, Caldes de Montbuí and Puigcerdà were common in Catalonia, while the recollection of the revolution of the cantons predominated in Andalusia, Cartagena and the Region of Valencia. This would change in the early 20th century, and the emotional experience and Carlism revived sites of worship for political use, like Butsènit and Montserrat in 1907, and organised gatherings in memory of the victims of Montalegre in 1910 and Vinyoles d'Orís in 1912. Some reflected a local calendar, like the longstanding Tres Roures gathering in Bages. Others displayed a considerable capacity to attract participants by combining the local and national calendars, as in the appropriation of the centennial celebrations of the Peninsular War with those of the 1808 Battles of Bruc in Manresa and Igualada in 1908. Further proof of its power was the "Pilgrimage of Loyalty" in 1913, which transferred the remains of Rafael Tristany from Lorda to Ardèvol.

One important instrument of political modernisation was social centres, especially the Carlist circle or casino. There were 28 of them in Catalonia during the Democratic Sexennium, even though it was common for the Carlist men and families in small cities to attend the Catholic circle when there was no Carlist one, with 26 in the entire country. This practice also aligned them as local political rivals. In 1892, there were 42 circles, but this figure had risen to 100 four years later, one-third of the total in Spain. The centres facilitated community outreach and served as a kind of inter-class mirror and grassroots base, as demonstrated by Jordi Canal in his study of the papers from the Carlist circle in Olot between 1889 and 1990, whose prominent members included artisans and workers, field hands, small merchants and landowners.[32] Plays and choirs were held in the circles; there was room for political speeches and leisure areas where members could have a coffee or liqueur, along with reading and billiard rooms. Later on, these activities were joined by banquets and literary soirées, night classes and charitable works.

Catalonia had the most boards and circles and was on the cutting edge in modernising Carlism, perhaps because it was the most advanced society and the one with the densest web of associations in all of Spain. The Region of Valencia had the second largest number of boards and circles during both the Democratic Sexennium and the Restoration, more than the Basque Country and Navarra,

Figure 6. *La Flaca*, 30 January 1873. Caricature against the Carlists.

where informal socialising was more common. Likewise, the existence of boards in Barcelona neighbourhoods was nothing new, as the towns of Gràcia, Sants and Hostafrancs had had them during the Sexennium before they were annexed to the city. However, this relative continuity should not conceal the advent of new forms of organisation and propaganda common to the advent of mass society, such as the Carlist youth groups in Barcelona in 1896 and Manresa in 1903, and women's groups, the "Daisies", in 1919.

In terms of propaganda, 35 newspapers were published in Catalonia during the Sexennium, while 99 appeared between 1876 and 1915, some of them temporary to avoid being suspended. The data reveal a lively civil society and a no less dense political life, which became fertile ground for political subcultures in Manresa, Olot, Vic, Igualada, Berga, Figueres, Tortosa and Mataró. Another indicator was Carlism's heavy electoral presence, specifically in the legislature of 1871 and 1872, where it achieved 13 seats, just behind the 15 for the republicans and 14 for the governing party. The total number of seats, along with the Carlists chosen in the Catholic candidacies from 1869 and 1870, was 17, an estimable number if we bear in mind that between 1890 and 1923, with universal suffrage, they earned 20 seats.

Lluís Maria de Llauder,[33] who had been the editor of the Barcelona newspaper *La Convicción* (1870-1873) and the founder and director of *El Correo Catalán* between 1878 and 1899, helped update the repertoire of mobilisation and national and international pilgrimages in the early years of the Restoration alongside Manuel de Llanza, Duke of Solferino. They once again led the Joventut Catòlica and the Associació de Catòlics. However, it was clear that the control over Catholic socialisation was not sufficient in the dispute over hegemonies. Attention to campaigns to get signatures for Catholic unity was displaced by campaigns to oppose the civil code and attention to Catalan interests. In the 1880s and 1890s, there emerged a web of Catalanist entities and politicised economic sectors where Carlism felt like a poor fit. Carlist jurists like Emili Sicars participated in the campaigns against the civil code, but the political initiative had been lost. Even though it has been demonstrated that the interest in the *furs* was not a historical peculiarity but an instrument to analyse the present, the most rigorous study of the time was written by two authors from outside Carlism, Josep Coroleu and Josep Pella i Forgas.

The Carlists were afraid of being engulfed by the increasing presence of Catalanism. They went from their initial disdain to apprehension over the new competitor.

At the end of the century, there were different signs of concern, as revealed in the document written by the Carlist minority in the Courts in 1897, known as the Acta de Loredan. Separatism should be considered an abomination; however, this was a double-edged sword. For the Carlists, stressing their distance from separatism was useful both at home, at a time of strong Spanish nationalisation, and abroad, to distance themselves from Catalanism and other extreme provincialisms. In any event, in the opinion of Llauder and many Catalan Carlists, one could not be a good Carlist without being a good Spaniard. Centralism was the outcome of parliamentary liberalism, not of Philip V or the Bourbon dynasty. This position was a far cry from the stance of the Catalanists, who sought to carve out their own space and not be confused with Catholic intransigence. How was it possible that the liberals, who had destroyed the Basque *fueros*, now wanted to be regionalists?

Historiography has compared the arcs of three figures in fin-de-siècle Carlism and their relationship with Catalanism: the aforementioned Lluís Maria de Llauder, the writer and painter Marià Vayreda and the pedagogue Joan Bardina.[34] It is clear that mechanical connections between foralism and Catalanism should not be sought. However, as the conflict caused by the Spanish nationalisation processes on the one hand and the regionalist mobilisation on the other progressed, Catalanism affected all political cultures. It is reasonable to think that Carlist and integralist foralism was one of the many substrates of the Catholic right who were part of the Catalanist family. Alongside them were a Carlist Hispanicism reluctant to talk about the *furs* and combative with Catalanism. The trajectories were intricate because rivalry permeated all nationalisation processes and all nationalisms, including Spanish nationalism. The key questions are why it was so difficult to maintain dual patriotism, and why the interpretations of it in Madrid and Barcelona were divergent. Might it be that part of historiography views the constitution of Spain as a nation-state, without fissures, as natural and teleological?

We have a long road ahead before we fully understand the local political traditions and more than just a handful personal histories, however valuable they may be. There are cases like the clergyman and journalist Gaietà Soler, who criticised Enric Prat de la Riba and his "practical Catalan liberalism" because this patriotism eroded religious foundations. Yet this story is contradicted by the figure who became the mayor of Manresa in a Catholic-regionalist candidacy in 1904, the former Integralist Pere Armengou i Manso, because as the historian Gemma Rubí has said, local politics was crucial. In terms of Carlism, it was the satellite of Catalanism precisely in a city like Manresa, which was the second most important stronghold of the Lliga Regionalista in Catalonia. In the city of Vic, the historian Xavier Tornafoch discovered that prominent Integralists like Manuel Moret and Joan Vilanova left the party to become Catalanists. In fact, Integralism is believed to have evolved towards regionalism and became an appendix to the Catalanist right thanks to its foralism. In contrast, the Carlists and Catalanists vied for a common space.[35]

Joan Bardina confirmed the overly schematic cliché of the Lliga Regionalista's shift from Carlism to Catalanism. Perhaps *Catalunya autònoma* (1899) and *Catalunya i els carlins* (1900) are the most notable cases in terms of the value of his writings. The author stressed opposition to separatism and Spanish confederalism, as well as the fact that Catalonia was the fatherland and the nation, and that it was as much a nation as Portugal was. The list of cases could go on. The economist from Lleida, Joan Bergós, was the driving force behind the Bases de Manresa, the founder of the Associació Cultural Catalanista and the cultivator of the Jocs Florals. Manuel Roger de Llúria, the top Carlist leader in in Lleida, left the Traditionalist Communion and became associated with Catalanist circles. Perhaps the path laid down in Mollerussa was representative of this model, although it gradually made its way into Catalanist dynamics, such as the Catalan language festival in 1916, the Acadèmia Montserratina and the Pomells de Joventut in 1920.

In any event, historians should not confuse these processes among the grassroots and some young leaders with the official position of the pretenders and the personnel closest to them. Mistrust of the scope of provincialism, foralism and traditionalist regionalism would remain a fixture in the hierarchy. This kind of issue was further exacerbated within the explosive context of mass society. The Duke of Solferino was 52 years old when he agreed to be the regional head of the Communion,[36] as he would again be in 1910 and 1915, and 1917 and 1919, representing the official line that was close to the Lliga both electorally and socially. The tactical shift to situate himself in the Lliga Regionalista camp was a matter of political survival. Internal cleavages were affected not only by the rapprochement with regionalism but also by two further factors. One was the extraordinary upswing in social conflicts, such as the 1902 general strike and Tragic Week in 1909. The other depended on local variables and the policies of alliances, which forced one to choose Catalanists or dynastics, or even republicans, as travelling companions in elections. These manoeuvres were uncomfortable for the regional board and ended with the expulsion of the Lleida leaders in 1913 and the dissolution of the Boards in the district of Berga and Manresa in 1917.

After strict centralist and militaristic repression, Carlist participation in the Solidaritat Catalana coalition (1907-1909) alongside Catalanists and republicans was the catalyst to securing six deputies. It also sealed one of its closest encounters with Catalanism. One of the masterminds was Miquel Junyent, who led the party in the province of Barcelona, served as the director of *El Correo Catalán* between 1903 and 1933 and would become the regional chief between 1915 and 1917 and 1919 and 1923. Tellingly, in 1916 the Marquise of Cerralbo warned about

becoming too dependent on the Lliga Regionalista because it was liberal, and due to "*su dudoso españolismo*" [its dubious Hispanicism]. As the victory of Solidaritat Catalana was still gelling, the Duke of Solferino, a senator, received an angry response from General José López Domínguez in the session on 21 February 1908. Regarding the idea that Catalonia was an autonomous state and Spain a confederation of states, the latter stated "*Para nosotros, para los verdaderos patriotas, para los hombres constitucionales y parlamentarios, eso equivale a ser antiespañol*" [To us, to the real patriots, to constitutional and parliamentary men, this is equivalent to being anti-Spanish].[37]

In 1930, the Lliga Regionalista regained control of the provincial council of Barcelona and was preparing to restore the Mancomunitat. Feeling banished, Carlism drafted a statute of autonomy, which signalled a major tactical and legal shift. The text upheld Catalonia's full autonomy via a free federation, the official status of the Catalan language, economic concert and "organic universal suffrage". Later, when the republican Generalitat was proclaimed and the statute of autonomy was being debated, it voted affirmatively despite its reservations about the wording and its disagreement with the religious issue. For the regionalist sector, represented by Tomàs Caylà, the 1932 statute did not conform to the idea of an Iberian confederation and was further insufficient because it did not stipulate that Catalonia would have its own army. Caylà was the last regional chief before the outbreak of the Civil War. He had previously directed *Joventut*, a weekly from Valls, where he had published Charles VII's promise to restore the *furs*. Caylà felt sincere Hispanicism and rejected separatism, yet a significant sector of Carlism negatively interpreted the historical rapprochement with the Lliga and aspired to uphold a uniform Spain.

Dalmacio Iglésies was one of the leaders who stood against regionalism because he believed that the priority was to become an alternative to the order of the Catalan right. All the Carlists wanted this, but Iglésies' plans addressed the social issue from a Hispanicist perspective. Alejandro Lerroux's republicans had to be dealt with vigorously with a social policy that was more autonomous from the Church. The mass policy was impacting the streets of Barcelona, and one sector of Carlism saw the opportunity to use the Carlist youth culture of violence against the Lerrouxist anticlerical impetuosity, while the official sector believed that the solution entailed instating Catholic and regionalist social paternalism. The clash between Carlists and republicans in Sant Feliu de Llobregat on 28 May 1912 resulted in five deaths, joined by the two deaths in Granollers on 13 August. To these young generations, the old formulas were useless, as proven by the failure of the 1900 uprising in Badalona, which shuttered the Carlist insurrectional circle.

In 1907, Joan Maria Roma assembled defence groups called "*requetès*". Three years later, under the direction of the Valencian politician and military officer Joaquim Llorens, they were transformed into a paramilitary group, shock force and youth school. It was the first one in Spain in the 20th century, comparable to the *Camelots du Roi* of *Action Française*. The Duke of Solferino was also opposed by weeklies like *La Trinchera* (1912-1919), which picked quarrels with *El Correo Catalán* and gave its readers Browning pistols and Mauser rifles. This strain of Carlism grew on the plain of Barcelona around the resurgence of numerous circles made up of workers and clerks from the middle and lower classes who had arrived in the wave of migration.

The anti-Lliga Carlist sector strengthened its bonds with far-right groups in the climate after the Great War. In late 1918 and early 1919, tensions on the streets between radical Catalanists and extreme Hispanicists surged in the midst the issue of approval of the draft statute of autonomy. Faced with the "*órdago separatista*" [separatist threat], the Liga Patriótica Española was formed with Carlists, civilian police, soldiers, civil servants, RCD Español football club fans and former Lerrouxists, elbow-to-elbow with Alfons Sala's Unión Monárquica Nacional. It was an amalgam that later served as a quarry for fascism. The outbreak of the La Canadenca strike in 1919 was a milestone in class solidarity, but it eclipsed the other conflicts. The Sindicats Lliures emerged within this context.

Formally, the Sindicats Lliures or Corporació General de Treballadors were founded in a meeting at Barcelona's Ateneu Obrer Legitimista in October 1919, and their first headquarters was the Círcol Central Tradicionalista in Barcelona. Prominent Carlists, councillors and journalists like Miquel Junyent participated in the gathering, but the leader of the project was the Carlist Ramón Sales, a former member of the mercantile union of the CNT. The Sindicats Lliures filled the void left by the failure of Catholic syndicalism by marginalising any reference to Carlism. These associations had exclusively professional and economic objectives.[38] Their origin stemmed from the difficulties that the Captaincy General and civil government, the utmost representatives of the state, were having controlling the streets. Perhaps it would be reductionistic to consider them a company union and the action-oriented arm of the manufacturers, but the authorities were not quite sure how to control society. Hence, the prominent role of figures like Bartolomé Roselló, commander of the military garrison, and the union's ties with the employers' association or the civil government, depending on the period. It was a cross-cutting wave of violence where gunmen from the police and employers' associations clashed with members of the *sometent* militia and the Sindicats Lliures, all against the CNT. Too many lives were snuffed out, including that of the syndicalist Salvador Seguí and the lawyer Francesc Layret.[39]

Ultimately it was a kind of violence that was common all over Europe in response to the crisis of parliamentary liberalism and the revolutionary peril. The era of the *cabdills* was over, and the age of the banalisation of violence

Figure 7. Monument erected in Montserrat (Catalonia) in 1965 in memory of the Catalan Carlists who died during the Civil War of 1936-1939.

was being ushered in. According to figures from the union itself, as reported by Colin M. Winston, the Sindicats Lliures reached 120,000 affiliates in Catalonia in 1929, within a favourable context and heavy anti-confederal repression. In 1936, supporting the antirepublican coup d'état, the Carlists had a theoretical contingent of 18,160 *requetès* in Catalonia, which would later feed the military shock unit of the Terç de Requetès de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat.[40]

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[8] *Diario de Sesiones de Cortes. Senado*, Madrid, 8 May 1843. Seoane even claims that he had heard these voices in the Parliament by several deputies: "Independencia de Cataluña. Esto es peor que si se hubiese proclamado a D. Carlos, que si se hubiese proclamado el Estatuto o el absolutismo, porque al fin bajo cualquiera de estas formas de gobierno, la Cataluña estaría unida a España, formaría un cuerpo y no debilitaría su poder" [Independence of Catalonia. This is worse than if Charles had been proclaimed king, than if the Statute or absolutism had been proclaimed, because ultimately under any of these forms of government, Catalonia would be wed to Spain, would be a single body and its power would not be weakened], pp. 331. Senator Alberto Felipe Baldrich, Marquise of Vallgornera responded.

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[10] Reflections from that period from the vantage point of moderate Catalan liberalism in Joan Mañé, Joaquín Mola, *Historia del bandolerismo y la camorra en la Italia meridional, con las biografías de los guerrilleros catalanes Borges y Tristany*, Barcelona, Salvador Manero, 1864; Francesc Roca, "Les aventures i desventures del crani del Comte d'Espanya. Paradigma d'una època?", in Daniel Montañà, Josep Rafart (Coords.), *Estat carlista: tradición i furs*, Centre d'Estudis d'Avià, pp. 95-106, 2014.

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